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FEDERAL-STATE WATER RIGHTS
INTRODUCTORY COMMENT

For many years there has been concern among the western
states over the necessity of preserving the integrity of state water
laws. The necessity for preserving state jurisdiction exists because
the economies of the western states are almost entirely dependent
upon the uses which have been made of the available supplies of
water. Rights to the use of water are among the most important
property rights. These rights have been acquired pursuant to state
water laws, and their validity has been recognized as being entirely
dependent upon state law.
The concern among the western states arises primarily because
of constant pressure from the U.S. Department of Justice to secure
judicial recognition of its claims that the federal government has
certain superior rights to the ownership and control of the waters
in western states.
The 1955 decision of FederalPower Comm'n v. Oregon' intensified this concern on behalf of the western states, and later that year
I joined other senators in co-sponsoring a bill which was introduced
as S. 863 in the 84th Congress. This bill was designed to remove
from the titles to water rights acquired under state law any clouds
which may have arisen from claims to superior federal rights, to
insure that any future acquisition of water rights would be in accordance with state laws, while at the same time affording a proper
measure of protection to federal governmental functions. In each
subsequent Congress, I have joined in sponsorship of similar bills;
but while extensive hearings have been held on these bills, no action
has been taken.
After the Committee cn Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S.
Senate had scheduled hearings for June 15 and 16 of 1961, upon the
general subject of the relationship between the respective federal
and state jurisdictions over water resource development, I requested
Mr. Allen Mitchem 2 to prepare a memorandum on state water rights
dealing with the legal basis of the doctrine which has prevailed in
Colorado. Because this memorandum presented a clear, intelligent
analysis of the legal problems relating to the federal claim of proprietary interest in the waters of western states, I asked that it be
inclided in the record of those hearings.
Inasmuch as Mr. Mitchem's pcsition differed rather markedly
from that previously held by the Department of Justice, Senator
C'inton P. Anderon 3 requested the Department of Justice to comment on the memorandu:m. 4 This article is comprised of the memorandum and the Justice Department's comments. 5 While these conflicting analyses speak for themselves, I cannot refrain from observing that the point of departure begins with the answer to a
1 349 U.S. 435 (1955).

2 Mr. Mitchem was serving as Minority Counsel for the Committee on Interior and Insular
of the U.S. Senate.
3 Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. Senate.
4 Those comments were received in the form of a letter dated July 19, 1961, from Ramsey
Assistant Attorney General, Lands Division, and this letter was likewise made a part of the
of the hearings. These comments appear in section IX, infra.
5 Ctations and some quotations from these documents have been footnoted; otherwise the
randa are substantially unchanged.

Affairs
Clark,
record
memo-

DICTA

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1962

single question: Did ownership of public lands in a state such as
Colorado ever carry with it ownership of water rights? After either

of the two theories is adopted, then a logical answer can be made
to justify the claims for federal or state authority, respectively.
Even assuming the answer to this question is in the affirmative,
it is my feeling that the difficult problems of potential conflict
between federal and state law in Colorado could be largely laid at
rest by an act of Congress containing language similar to that in
section 2 of the proposed bill attached to Mr. Mitchem's memorandum6 or by an act containing language whereby the federal government would quit-claim any such proprietary water rights to
the respective states.
-Senator

Gordon Allott

I. STATE WATER RIGHTS-PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STATEMENT

by

ALLEN P.

MITCHEM

Having read and studied most of the printed statements, hearings, and reports of the Senate Interior Committee during the past

five years on the subject of state water rights legislation, and being
generally familiar with the court decisions in this field, I have yet
to find presented, to my satisfaction as a student of water law, an
adequate statement of the theory of the appropriation system of
water law as it exists in Colorado and in several of the neighboring
states. I think the theory of this so-called Colorado doctrine has a

substantial bearing upon the necessity for legislation as well as
the form it should take.

This paper is not intended as an authoritative, documented
piece of research, but only as a preliminary statement of my initial

reaction after reading the statements and testimony which has
heretofore been presented to the committee.
No attempt will be made to deal with the power and control of
the federal government over the waters of this nation under what
has been frequently described as the navigational servitude, a
power which stems from the commerce clause of the Constitution.

This paper will deal entirely with the claim of the federal government to have a proprietary interest in the waters or water rights
on public lands, which claim is said to be founded on the property
clause of the Constitution.
II.

NATURE OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS AS PROPERTY

It is elementary that any discussion of the relative rights of the
federal and state governments in this area of conflict should begin
with a clarification of terms, and a recognition of the differences
between water in natural streams, water rights, and water as personal property.
A. Water in Natural Streams
So long as water remains in natural streams or watercourses,
it is not the subject of ownership by anyone. It is neither real nor
personal property. This has been generally recognized since the
6 Infra note 39.
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days of Justinian, who described such waters as belonging to the
"negative community." In this respect it is said to resemble the
pearls at the bottom of the sea, or the birds that are flying overhead.
This result is generally accepted both in states following the
riparian doctrine and those following the appropriation system.
Nevertheless, a few cases will be found in riparian states where
the courts have mistakenly asserted that the riparian landowner
"owns" the water in a stream running through his land. Similarly,
in several of the western states, statutes or constitutional provisions
may be found wherein the state proclaims that the waters of all
natural streams within such state are thd property of the state or
the public, subject to appropriation under state law. Such statutes
and constitutional provisions have consistently been held to mean
simply that the state has political sovereignty over such waters,
and not that the state actually claims a property interest in the
corpus of such flowing waters.
B. Water Rights
In both riparian and appropriation states, a water right consists
merely of the right to the use of water. It has been described as a
"usufructuary right." It is real property and more specifically described as an incorporeal hereditament, meaning simply that it is
an invisible or intangible species of property capable of being inherited.
The law which determines the extent or limitations of a water
right, whether riparian water rights attach to a given tract of land,
and when and how an appropriative water right comes into existence, is entirely state law. It has been recognized that the federal
government has never attempted to establish a general system of
water law of its own.
C. Water as Personal Property
In many states it is held that when a person, in the exercise
of a water right, diverts water from a natural stream and thus
reduces it to possession, such water then becomes personal property.
III.

VARIATIONS IN

STATE SYSTEMS

OF WATER LAW

While there has been considerable testimony before the committee recognizing the fundamental distinctions between the riparian system and the appropriation system of water law, in my
opinion there has been insufficient attention given to the basic
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differences in the theories supporting the appropriation doctrine in
states.
the western
It is well recognized that a riparian water right is part and
parcel of riparian land. Ownership of riparian land carries with it
ownership of the riparian water right. The riparian water right
cannot be conveyed separate from the land to which it is attached.
Use does not create the right, and nonuse will not destroy it.
On the other hand, ownership of riparian land does not carry
with it any appropriative water right. In a state which recognizes
only appropriation water rights, use is the only means of initiating
a water right. An appropriation is made by means of a diversion
of water with the intent to acquire a water right and an application
of water to a beneficial use. Once the appropriation water right has
thus been acquired, in most western states, subject to certain limitations, it may be conveyed separate and apart from any land upon
which it may have been used.
A. The Colorado Doctrine
While it is well recognized that the appropriation system had
its beginnings in the mining camps of California, it was the Supreme Court of Colorado which first set forth a simple, concise and
understandable explanation of its theoretical justification for the
appropriation doctrine. The case referred to is that of Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Company,7 a landmark in western water law. This has
been recognized for almost 80 years as setting forth the theoretical
basis for Colorado water law. A careful study of the implications
of this case will disclose the following characteristic features of the
so-called Colorado doctrine:
(1) Because of climatic conditions and arid conditions of the soil,
the riparian system of water law was never applicable to streams
in Colorado.
(2) As a consequence, ownership of so-called riparian lands
within the state, whether by private individuals, by the federal
7 6 Colo. 443 (1882). The court stated at 446. "It is contended by counsel for appellants that the
common law principles of riparian proprietorship prevailed in Colorado until 1876, and that the doctrine of prior'ty of right to water by priority of appropriat:on thereof was first recognized and adopted in the constitution. But we think the latter doctrine has existed from the date of the earliest ap.
prapratons of water within the boundaries of the State. The climate is dry, and the soil, when
mostened only by the usual rainfall, is cr'd and unproductive; except for a few favored sections,
artificial irrigation for agrculture is an absolute necess'ty. Water in the various streams thus acquires
a value unknown in mo:ster climates. Instead of being a mere incident of the soil, it rises, when
appropriated, to the dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate, or right of property. It has always
been the policy of the Notional, as well as the Territorial and State Governments to encourage the
diversion and use of water in this country for agriculture; and vast expenditures of time and money
have been made in reclaiming and fert.lizing by irrigation portions of our unproductive territory.
Houses have been built, and permanent improvements made; the soil has been cultivated, and thousrnds tof acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that appropriations
of wcter would be protected. Deny the doctrine of priority or superiority of right by priority or appro::r'o ton, and a great pcrt of the value of all this property is at once destroyed.
"The right to water in this country, by priority of appropriation thereof, we think it is, and has
always been, the duty of the National and State Governments to protect. The right itself, and the
obligation to protect it, existed prior to legislation on the subject of irrigation. It is entitled to protection as well after patent to a third party of the land over which the natural stream flows, as when
such land is a port of the public domain, and it is immaterial whether or not it be mentioned in the
patent and expressly excluded from the grant.
"The act of Congress protecting in patents such right in water appropriated, when recognized by
local customs and laws, 'was rather a voluntary recognition of a preexisting right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use, than the establishment of a new one.' B'oder v. Natoma
W. & M. Co., 11 Otto 274.
"We conclude, then, that the common law doctrine giving the riparian owner a right to the flow
of water in its natural channel upon and over his lands, even though he makes no beneficial use
thereof, is inapplicable to Colorado. Imperative necessity, unknown to the countries which gave it
b:rth, compe!s the recognition of another doctrine in conflict therewith. And we hold that, in the
absence of express statutes to the contrary, the first appropriator of water from a natural stream for
a beneficial purpose, has, with the
,alificotions contained in the constitution, a prior right thereto,
to the extent of such appropriation." [Emphasis supplied.]
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government or by the state itself, carried with such ownership no
water rights.
(3) The only way in which a water right can be acquired in
Colorado is by the method of appropriation (except, of course, by
purchase, descent, Londemnatlon, and prescription involving an
existing appropriation right).
(4) Once an appropriation is made, a water right comes into
existence for the first time as a property interest. This right does
not come from either the federal or state government, although it
is acquired pursuant to state law.
(5) Inasmuch as the federal government never owned any water
rights in Colorado merely by virtue of being owner of public lands
in that state, it had (and still has) no "title" to water rights that
it could grant to the state or to individual appropriators on public
lands; and the consent of the federal government to appropriations
by individuals has been unnecessary, except to the extent that
rights-of-way upon public lands for construction and maintenance
of diversion works must be acquired from the federal government
and in conformity with federal laws.
(6) The acts of Congress of 1866, 1870, and 1877, therefore,
merely constituted gratuitious recognition of appropriation rights
that had been acquired under state law; however, such recognition
was hardly necessary in a state which had adopted the Colorado
doctrine of water law unless, of course, such state had transgressed
its constitutional prerogative in proclaiming the doctrine.
B. The California Doctrine
Although there had been earlier court decisions and statutes
in California dealing with water rights, the more definitive explanation of that state's system of water law, and the theories used
to justify it, did not come until 1886 in the case of Lux v. HagginY
In that case, the California court took the position that since,
if not before, the admission of California into the Union, the United
States had been the owner of all nonnavigable streams on the public
lands within the borders of the state. The court did not feel compelled to express an opinion as to whether this conclusion was necessary by virtue of the treaty with Mexico or because of the act
of Congress admitting California to statehood. The court did state
that if the above conclusion was not brought about by the treaty
or act of Congress, at least it was dictated by one of the first acts
of the California legislature of April 13, 1850, which adopted the
''common law of England" as the rule of decision in all courts of
that state. The "common law" thus adopted for California was
interpreted to include the recognition of riparian rights of landowners whose land bordered upon streams.9
869 Cal. 255, 10 Poc. 674 (1886).
9 Id. at 338, 10 Pac. at 721. The court states: "If the innavigable rivers and their beds belonged to the State when admitted into the Union, the State could grant or surrender them to the
riparian proprietors of whom the United States was one . . . We think .. .the act of April 13,1850,
should now be held to have operated (at least from the admission into the Union) as a transfer or
surrender, to all r:parian propretors, of the property of the state, if any she had, in innavigable
streams, and the soils below them." [Emphasis supplied.]
The California court thus reconized that riparicn water rights could and did exist in that state.
The court stated at 720: "A grant of public lands of the United States carries with it the common-law
rights to an innavigable stream thereon, unless the waters are expressly or impliedly reserved by the
terms of the patent, or of the statute granting the land, or unless they are reserved by the congressional legislation authorizing the potent or other muniment of title."
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The riparian water right, which attached to the land described
in a patent, thus was acquired by the patentee from the federal
government, but it was very possibly state law (e.g., the act of
April 13, 1850), which had the effect of "granting or surrendering"
such rights to the federal government in the first place.
Notwithstanding the recognition of the existence of riparian
water rights in the state of California, the protection which the
state was to accord to appropriation water rights became even
stronger with the adoption of the first civil code of that state. As
quoted in Lux v. Haggin, section 1410 of the code provided: "The
right to the use of running water flowing in a river or stream, or
down a canyon or ravine, may be acquired by appropriation."' 10
As in the case of the riparian water right in California, the
"title" to the appropriation water right passed to the appropriator
from the federal government. In Lux v. Haggin it was said:
It has never been held that the right to appropriate
waters on the public lands of the United States was derived
directly from the State of California as the owner of innavigable streams and their beds; and since the act of
Congress (of 1866) granting and recognizing a property in
the waters actually diverted and usefully applied on the
public lands of the United States, such rights have always
been claimed to be deraigned by private persons under the
act of Congress, from the recognition accorded by the act,
or from the acquiescence of the General Government in
previous appropriations made with its presumed sanction
and approval.11
Since Lux v. Haggin, there have been many refinements in
California water law, and I make no claim that every statement
made in that early case would be accepted as law in California
today. One significant change in California water law resulted from
an amendment to the state's constitution which seriously curtailed
the common law riparian water right. Nevertheless, this case set
forth the following distinguishing features of the "California doctrine":
(1) Beginning in the year 1850, except for existing
rights, all rights to the unappropriated waters of nonnavigable streams on the public lands in California were recognized as being in the federal government.
(2) When the federal government thereafter issued a
.patent to riparian lands, the water rights, which the federal
government theretofore owned as a result of ownership of
that particular land, passed to the patentee along with the
land. This riparian water right of the patentee thus came
from the federal government.
(3) When an appropriation was made by diversion at a
point on public lands in California, the appropriator thereby acquired an appropriation water right by virtue of what
has been referred to as a grant, confirmation, consent, or
acquiescence of the federal government under the federal
statutes of 1866, 1870, or 1877.
11|Supra note 8.
11 Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 338, 10 Pac. 674, 721 (1886).
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(4) Despite the fact that both types of water rights were
thus said in California to come from the federal government, this nevertheless was the result of a state system of
water law which rested upon state statute and court decision.

C. Doctrines in Other Western States
While each of the other western states was, of course, free to
adopt its own system of water law, and while each has done so
with varying details, it can generally be said that all of the western
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states have subscribed in a greater or lesser degree to the theoretical justification underlying either the Colorado doctrine or the California doctrine. No attempt has been made to research the water
laws of each of the seventeen western states, but it has sometimes
been asserted that the states initially lined up (following a period
of uncertainty in the instance of Nevada and Montana) as follows:
California doctrine: California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington.
Colorado doctrine: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
It should be reemphasized that all of the individual characteristics of either the Colorado or California doctrine have not been
accepted in toto by the other states. It should also be noted that
some of the states, more closely associated with the California doctrine initially, have subsequently seen fit in one way or another to
impose limitations upon that doctrine-particularly its recognition
of riparian rights.
In this connection it has already been mentioned that a constitutional amendment was adopted in California some thirty-five
years ago. This amendment severely altered common law incidents
of the riparian water right in that state. Washington, Nebraska,
Oregon, and perhaps other states which were originally allied more
closely with the California doctrine have, by court action or otherwise, placed limitations on the acquisition of riparian rights.
Of particular interest, because of a possible explanation of the
decision in Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon,12 is the development
of the state law of Oregon in this connection. In a rather lengthy
opinion in Hough v. Porter,' the Supreme Court of Oregon recognized that patents to lands in Oregon which had been issued by
the federal government prior to the date of the Desert Land Act
(March 3, 1877),14 carried with them riparian rights. The Oregon
court observed that through the Desert Land Act Congress thereby
"reserved" for the benefit of the public (for later acquisition by
appropriation) all waters flowing through any lands constituting
the public domain. As a result of this construction given to the
Desert Land Act, the Oregon court held that patents to land issued
after the date of that act carried with them no riparian rights, or
at least only very limited riparian rights.
The position taken by the Oregon court in Hough v. Porter"
is significant because it recognized that (1) both riparian rights
(resulting from patents issued before 1877) and appropriation rights
came from the federal government, and (2) the Desert Land Act
itself, as construed by the Oregon court, constituted a "reservation"
or "dedi-ation" to the public by the federal government of all unappropriated waters on the public domain. It may well be argued
that because of these factors, the influence of the Pelton Dam,"
decision (wherein the U. S. Supreme Court construed the Desert
Land Act as being inapplicable to reserved or withdrawn lands)
should be largely confined to the State of Oregon, because the basis
12349 U.S. 435 (1955). Hereafter referred to as the Pelton Dan
1: 51 Ore. 318, 98 Pac. 1083 (1909).
14 19 Stat.3717,43 U.S.C. §§ 321-5 (1877).
1 Supra note 13.
16 Supra note 12.

case.
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of that state's modern water law rested largely upon its own construction (erroneous, according to the Pelton case) of the Desert
Land Act.
IV. FEDERAL CLAIMS TO A PROPRIETARY INTEREST
In several recent cases wherein the United States was a party,
the claim has been made on behalf of the federal government that
it owns all the unappropriated waters (at least in nonnavigable
streams) on public lands.
A. Nature of Claims
These claims have been described in the following language:
"The argument is that the United States acquired the original
ownership of all rights in the water as well as the lands in the
North Platte Basin by cessions from France, Spain, and Mexico in
1803, 1819, and 1848, and by agreement with Texas in 1850. It says
it still owns those 7 rights in water to whatever extent it has not
disposed of them."'
A further assertion of such claims is found in a brief filed on
June 30, 1959, by the United States in Arizona v. California,IS as
follows:
By withdrawal of lands from the public domain and
reservation thereof for Federal purposes, the already existing right to use unappropriated appurtenant water is insulated against appropriation under local laws. The quantum of right so reserved is at least the quantity of water
necessary for the beneficial uses of the Government property. The right is not limited by past use, and is not lost
by nonuse.1 1
The Supreme Court has not found it ne-essary to pass directly
upon the validity of such claims in the cases which have heretofore
been before it; however, the decision in the Pelton Dam case unquestionably gave considerable comfort to the advocates of these
federal claims to a "proprietary" interest in waters or water rights
on public lands. This case will be referred to again later.
B. Constitutional Basis for Federal Claims
The asserted basis for such claims of a proprietary interest is
the property clause of the Constitution,-" which provides: "The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to Prejudice any claims of the United States, or
of any particular State." This provision of the Constitution has been
construed as being plenary in nature and as giving Congress virtually unlimited control over the property of the United States,
which of course includes its public lands.
C. Analysis of Claims
From the previous discussion of "water in natural streams"
and "water rights," as well as the specific language used above in
17 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 539, 611 (1945).
Is

Ar:zona v. Colifornia,-

U.S. ---.

1X Brief for United States, Arizona v. Californio --• * U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 (2).

U.S.
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asserting these claims, it becomes apparent that the United States
is not claiming "title" to the water itself which flows in the streams
since such water has never been recognized as being property either
in civil law or common law jurisprudence. It therefore follows that
the claim is to ownership of "water rights." The contention is that
these water rights do not arise from use and are not lost from nonuse. These claims then are to rights to the use of water, somewhat
analogous to riparian rights, for they are said to belong to the
federal government solely upon the basis that the United States
owns the soil; however, those who assert such rights on behalf of
the federal government have carefully avoided designating these
claimed rights as riparian rights. Perhaps this results from a realization of certain limitations upon riparian rights implicit in the
common law riparian system which the advocates of federal ownership wish to avoid. These limitations include the following:
(1) Water may be used only on the riparian lands.
(2) Water cannot be diverted out of the watershed of a stream.
(3) "Domestic" uses have a priority over "artificial" uses of
water.
(4) For artificial purposes, the riparian owner's right extends
only to the use of a reasonable amount of water.
Because these usual limitations upon riparian rights are very
likely inconsistent with the purposes for which such asserted federal
claims are made, we are left with the bare assertion of "water
rights" of an undefined nature and quantity and apparently of a
character unknown to any existing system of law.
V. THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES THUS RAISED
The mere statement of such federal claims discloses obvious
inconsistencies with the assumptions underlying the foundations
of western water laws which have been recognized for almost a
century. However, one should not overlook the fact that the conflicts are of a different nature, depending upon whether and to what
extent the given state has subscribed to the Colorado doctrine or
the California doctrine.
A. Conflict with CaliforniaDoctrine
Because of the basic assumption of the California doctrine that,
at least beginning with the year 1850, all rights to unappropriated
waters on nonnavigable streams on public lands were held by the
federal government, interpretation of the acts of Congress dealing
with water and state water laws has been of prime importance.
Although, as previously observed, the state law at least contributed
to such water rights being in the federal government, it has been
difficult for these states to find acceptable theories, outside the acts
of Congress, which demonstrate that the federal government no
longer has a residue of water rights on public lands in those states.
Primary reliance has been placed upon the asserted effect of
the operation of the acts of Congress of July 26, 1866, -1 July 9,
1870,'-' and the Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877,2 as well as num.,114 Stat.

253, 43 U.S.C.
2'2 16 Stat. 218, 43 U.S.C.
23 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C.

661 (1926).
661 (1926).
321-25 (1926) as amended, 1958.
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erous other statutes. The state of Oregon argued that these acts
constituted an express congressional delegation or conveyance to
the state of the power to regulate the use of the waters there involved. Without passing upon this contention the Supreme Court
held that these acts were
not applicable to reserved lands and
4
waters there involved.

It has also been contended that whatever title to water rights
the federal government had on such public lands was held in trust
for the states and the people thereof. Other arguments have also
been advanced, but there has been difficulty in presenting a logical
and convincing argument that, once the state itself expressly recognized "title" to such water rights as being in the federal government,
such "title" or control over water subsequently passed back to the
states.
B. Conflict with Colorado Doctrine
It should be apparent that the states which have adopted the
Colorado doctrine are in a much better position to resist the claims
of the federal government from both a logical and a theoretical
standpoint. They have proclaimed from the beginning that the
riparian system was inapplicable to their arid lands, and that no
water rights ever existed within those states which were "part and
parcel of the soil" and which arose solely by virtue of ownership
of the land. Therefore, reliance upon the federal statutes mentioned
above becomes unnecessary, provided the selection and adoption of
a system of water law is the sole prerogative of the state itself.
24 Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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Although the only method by which water rights can be acquired in Colorado is by making an appropriation, there is no discrimination against the federal government which is also permitted
to make whatever appropriations are necessary for use on government property. If existing rights have been acquired to the extent
that a given stream is already overappropriated before a federal
development takes place, then the federal government may resort
to its powers of eminent domain.
Before considering the validity of assumptions underlying the
Colorado doctrine, attention should be called to some perplexing
questions that would arise if those assumptions were held invalid
and recognition were given to the asserted proprietary water rights
in Colorado.
(1) Assuming the existehce of such federal proprietary rights on
public lands in Colorado, would it be possible for Congress, through
legislation which superseded the Desert Land Act, to authorize the
issuance of patents to lands in Colorado which carried with them
riparian or equivalent rights? If the authority for establishing a
system of water law within a state is not exclusively a matter of
state concern, would it not follow that such action by Congress
could result in a complete rewriting of the water law of that state
by the federal government? This possibility exists because the problem of correlating riparian rights with appropriation rights (which
has presented so much difficulty in California doctrine states)
would also become a federal question.
(2) If federal ownership of lands carries with it something equivalent to riparian rights, purchases of lands in Colorado by the
federal government from private individuals would seem to have
the same effect. If so, what is the source of the title to such water
rights thus acquired by the federal government?
If the answer to these questions seems difficult, it may be
suggested that such complexity arises out of attempts to exert federal authority into a field not contemplated by the U.S. Constitution.
VI.

WATER LAW-STATE OR FEDERAL PREROGATIVE?

As above noted, the asserted claims of the federal government
are said to arise out of the property clause of the Constitution. They
rest entirely upon the assumption that the thing claimed is itself
property. It has already been demonstrated that, under the law of
Colorado as proclaimed by that state, there is no property interest
in running streams until an appropriation has been initiated. The
issue then becomes: Is the determination of how a water right
arises, and what type of water right can exist within a state, a
matter within the exclusive province of the state; or is it within the
exclusive province of Congress; or does it fall in an area of concurrent jurisdiction?
There is considerable logic and authority supporting the view
that it is exclusively within the province of the state.
The Supreme Court in at least two cases has been rather explicit upon this point. In Clark v. Nash2 the Court said:
25- 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
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The rights of a riparian owner in and to the use of the
water flowing by his land are not the same in the arid and
mountainous States of the West that they are in the States
of the East. These rights have been altered by many of the
Western States, by their constitutions and laws, because of
the totally different circumstances in which their inhabitants are placed, from those that exist in the States of the
East, and such alterations have been made for the very
purpose of thereby contributing to the growth and prosperity of those States arising from mining and the cultivation of an otherwise valueless soil by means of irrigation.
This Court must recognize the difference of climate and
soil which renders
2 6 necessary these different laws in the
States so situated.
27
In Kansas v. Colorado
the Supreme Court said: It [a state]
may determine for itself whether the common-law rule in respect
to riparian rights or that doctrine which obtains in the arid regions
of the West of the appropriation of waters for the purposes of irrigation28 shall control. Congress cannot enforce either rule upon any
State.
Recognizing that the principles of the appropriation system
were developed as a part of the common law in the western states
and territories, it would seem that the admonition of the Supreme
Court in the historic case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 29 would have
applicability to this problem. There it was said:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the:
State shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or by
its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no Federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a state whether they be local in their
nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of
the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports
to confer such a power upon the Federal courts . . ..
In referring to the eighty-year reign of the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson,31 the Supreme Court said that the doctrine of that case was
"an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts of the
United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion
should make us hesitate to correct." The Court pointed out that
under Swift v. Tyson, the "Federal courts assumed, in a broad field
of 'general law,' the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes."
But even if we assume that, under the property clause of the
Constitution, Congress would have power to define the incidents
of its ownership of public lands as including riparian water rights,
it should be clear that Congress has not done so, nor has Congress
attempted to "force either rule upon the states." Beginning with the
26 (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 370.
27 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
2.9 (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 94.
29 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30 Id. at 78.
31 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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act of 1866 and continuing on through numerous statutes passed
over a period of some ninety years, Congress has manifested its
intention that state water laws shall govern in the western states.
There is a complete absence of any acts whereby Congress sought
to establish any system of water law in the West at variance with
those of the states.
A review of the enabling acts of the western states discloses
that the most commonly used clause contained a reservation to the
United States of "the unappropriated public lands" or of the "soil"
within the boundaries of the state or territory. If there had been an
intent on the part of Congress to "reserve" any water or water
rights free from the control of the states, such intention could very
easily have been expressed. No such expression of intention however appears.
It might also be suggested that if the federal government has
the constitutional power by virtue of the property clause to claim
title to water or water rights on public lands, such power rests in
Congress alone rather than in other branches of the federal government. As a consequence, a decisive factor would appear to be the
legislative intent, so clearly and repeatedly expressed in numerous
acts, to the effect that state water laws are to be respected.
VII. JUDICAL RECOGNITION OF FEDERAL PROPRIETARY INTEREST

As previously noted, in most cases wherein the claim of a
proprietary interest of the United States in waters or water rights
on public lands has been urged, the Supreme Court found that a
specific ruling upon the question was unnecessary to dispose of the
case. There have been, however, at least three cases wherein the
Court appeared to give recognition to the existence of such proprietary interest.
The first of these cases was United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.32 This case undoubtedly turned upon an act of Congress
which prohibited "the creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively
authorized by law, to the navigable capacity of any waters, in
respect of which the United States has jurisdiction. '33 Pursuant
to this statute the Department of Justice instituted an action to
enjoin construction of a dam across the Rio Grande in what was

then the Territory of New Mexico. Although the lower courts
found the Rio Grande in New Mexico to be nonnavigable and dismissed the suit, the Supreme Court reversed with instructions to
determine whether the defendant's proposed construction of the
dam and appropriation of waters therefrom for irrigation would
"substantially diminish the navigability of [the Rio Grande] within
the limits of present navigability, and if so, to enter a decree restraining those acts to the extent that they will so diminish."
From a reading of the entire opinion, it seems clear that the
primary interest of the federal government which the Supreme
Court sought by its decision to safeguard was the right of Congress,
in the interests of commerce, to preserve the "navigable capacity"
of streams, free from interference by others.
32 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
33 § 10, 26 Stat. 454 (1890).
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Nevertheless, in the course of the opinion, Mr. Justice Brewer,
speaking for the Court, said:
Although this power of changing the common law rule
as to streams within its dominion undoubtedly belongs to
each State, yet two limitations must be recognized: First,
that in the absence of specific authority from Congress a
State cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream,
to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be
necessary for the beneficial uses of the Government property. Second, that it is limited by the superior power of the
General Government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of the
United States.
It will be seen that the second limitation on the power of
states mentioned by the court is directly tied to the commerce
clause. It was that "superior power of the General Government"
which had been exercised by Congress through the above-mentioned act of 1890. It was necessary to give recognition to the
"superior power" in the proper disposition of the case.
The first limitation on the power of the states mentioned by
Mr. Justice Brewer, however, was not involved in the case then
before the court. It was a gratuitous statement of the court which
has been seized upon as authority for federal claims to "ownership"
of some specie of water rights in connection with public lands,
existing solely by virtue of the ownership of such lands, irrespective
of any state law upon the subject.
Insofar as this limitation on the power of the states may have
been accepted as an authoritative pronouncement in 1899, it was
unquestionably formulated as a rule of "Federal general common
law" during the reign of Swift v. Tyson, and should no longer be
regarded as binding upon the states in contravention of state water
law since the decision of Erie v. Tompkins.
The second case to be considered is Winters v. United States.34
The question was whether the creation of the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation, by a treaty ratified May 1, 1888, with Indian tribes in
Montana entitled the Indian tribes to the use of waters from the
Milk River, which bordered the reservation, as against white
34 207 US. 564 (1908).
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settlers, without regard to priority of use. The Supreme Court
upheld the claims of the Indians, saying: "The power of the government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation
under the State laws is not denied, and could not be .... That the

Government did reserve them we have decided, and
'35 for a use
which would be necessarily continued through years.
To the extent that this case may be relied upon as authority
for the federal government's proprietary claim, it should be pointed
out that it has long been recognized that state law does not apply to
the affairs of Indians on reservations except so far as, and to the
extent that, the United States gives or has given its consent. Without express approval by either the Indian tribe or the federal
government, even state laws of inheritance would have no application to Indians residing on an Indian reservation. It would hardly
be expected that state water laws would be on a different footing.
The third case, which has been previously discussed to some
extent, is Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon36 (referred to as the
Pelton Dam case). It is felt that an understanding of the full significance of this case must give recognition to the theoretical justification for the state law which Oregon urged was being violated
through the failure of the Federal Power Commission's licensee to
comply therewith. From the previous discussion of the Oregon case
of Hough v. Porter,37 it would appear that the Oregon court had
recognized that, at least prior to March 3, 1877, the federal government had some sort of interest in waters on the public lands in
that state arising solely by virtue of ownership of those lands.
Starting from this basic premise, Hough v. Porter held that the
Desert Land Act constituted a "grant" or "dedication" by the federal government of ,those waters to the public for acquisition by
appropriation pursuant to state water laws.
It may be reasoned then that the U. S. Supreme Court in the
Pelton Dam case merely accepted the same basic premises furnished
by the Oregon State law and construed the federal statute as
applying only to "public lands" and as being inapplicable to lands
"reserved" for an Indian reservation or for other purposes. When
the Pelton Dam case is viewed against this background of the
Oregon state law, one might question the applicability of that
decision to reserved lands in states following the Colorado doctrine, whose water law is founded on the premise that mere ownership of land never carried with it any water rights.
Another question involved in the Pelton Dam case, which had
been previously dealt with by the Supreme Court in First Iowa
Coop v. Federal Power Comm'n, 38 was the extent to which federal
agencies and licensees are or should be compelled, in perfecting
water rights, to comply with procedural requirements of state water
laws. Without going into this question, it will merely be noted that
this involves an area of federal-state relations very largely influenced by both the intent of Congress in its various statutory enactments and the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
35 Id. at 577.
36 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
37 51 Ore. 318, 98 Pac. 1083 (1909)
38 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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VIII. CONCLUSION

When attention is turned to the necessity and form of legislation designed to resolve the conflict between federal and state
governments on the subject of water rights, the following conclusions can be drawn:
(1) The claim of the federal government to a proprietary interest in western waters is founded solely on the assumption that
ownership of land by the federal government carries with it ownership upon any act of Congress; nor is the underlying assumption
necessary to a proper interpretation of the property clause of the
U. S. Constitution.
(2) All acts of Congress heretofore providing for recognition of
state water laws and affording protection of water rights acquired
thereunder, have likewise proceeded upon the same assumption,
i.e., that the United States must have had some interest in water
arising solely from ownership of land; and therefore, congressional
recognition of state water laws and water rights acquired under
such laws was necessary to give them validity. To a large extent
S. 211 and the pending House bills dealing with state water rights
follow this same approach.
(3) As a result, it has probably been the duty of the U. S. Government agencies to take the position that there is some residue of
water rights left in the federal government:
(a) to the extent that federal lands have not passed into
state or private ownership,
(b) to the extent that federal lands have been withdrawn
or reserved, or
(c) to the extent that water rights have not vested and
accrued under state laws.
(4) Furthermore, any new act of Congress dealing with public
lands, with federal projects or development, or with a federal
agency charged with the preservation, management or development of natural resources, where such act of Congress does not
make the ne:essary specific and complete reference to integrity
of state water laws, will be subject to the possible construction that
state water laws were at least partly superseded by virtue of the
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
. (5) The surest way to attack the question of a federal proprietary interest in western waters, so as to settle once and for all time
this question that has been left unsettled since the discovery of gold
in California in 1848, is to deal directly with the problem of whether
ownership of land by the federal government carries with it ownership of any water rights. Once the federal government disclaims
any ownership of water rights independently of state law, the
"residue" of proprietary water rights of the federal government will
have vanished unless state law provides otherwise.
(6) Suggested language to accomplish this purpose is as follows:
The ownership by the United States of any lands
within a state, whether such lands be now or hereafter
classified as public, reserved, withdrawn, acquired or otherwisP., shall constitte ownership by the United States of
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rights to the use of ground waters or waters of a natural
stream only to the extent that it is now or may hereafter be
provided by the laws of such state that ownership of land

within such state shall include, as an incident of such ownto the use of ground waters or waters of a
ership, the right
39
natural stream.
IX.

JusTicE DEPARTMENT'S

COMMENTS ON MITCHEM STUDY
40

by Ramsey Clark

The main thrust of the memorandum is an effort to establish
that the ownership of property rights to the use of water, whether
by the United States or by others, is dependent upon the recognition
of such rights under state law. As to those of the western states in
which the so-called Colorado doctrine of water rights applies, it is
argued that appropriation in the manner provided by state law is
the only means by which a water right may come into existence in
those states. Therefore, it is said, the federal government can own
no right to use water on the public domain in those states simply
as an appurtenance to its original ownership of such lands. With
respect to the California doctrine, which is based on state recognition that the United States, as original owner of the public domain,
is the source from which all titles to privately owned rights to the
use of water must be derived, the memorandum asserts "but it was
very possibly state law (e.g., the [California] act of April 13, 1850)
39 The proposed b:ll which would deal not only with the problems arising in this area under the
property clause of the Constitut:on, but also with those arising under the supremacy clause and the
so-cotled navigational servitude crising from the commerce clause follows:
"A BILL To promote harmony between the United States and the States of the Union with
respect to the administraton of water, to strengthen rights, to the use of water acquired
under State low, and for other purposes.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the 'Western Water Rights Settlement Act of 1961.'
"Sec. 2. The ownership by the United States of any lands within a State, whether such
lands be now or hereafter classified as public, reserved, withdrawn, acquired or otherwise,
shell constitute ownership by the United States of rights to the use of ground waters or
watcrs of a natural stream only to the extent that it is now or may hereafter be provided by
the laws of such State that ownership of land within such State shall include, as an incident
of such ownership, the r:ght to the use of ground waters or waters of a natural stream.
"Sec. 3. Unless expressly so provided therein, no Act of Congress shall be construed so
as to interfere with or supersede the law of any State relating to the method or procedure
by which a right to the use of ground waters or waters of a natural stream within such
State is recogn'zed or established as a property right; and Federal agencies and permittees,
Icensees, and emaloyees of the Government, in the use of such waters for any purpose in
connection with Federal programs, projects, licenses, or permits, shall acquire rights to the
use thereof in conformity with State laws and procedures relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of such waters.
"Sec. 4. Subject to existing rights the -use for navigation of waters arising in States
lying wholly or partly west of the 98th meridian shall be only such use as does not conflict
with any beneficial use thereof, present or future, in States lying wholly or partly west of the
98th meridicn, of such waters for domestc, municipal, stock water, irrigation, mining, or
industrial purposes.
"Sec. 5. Nothing in this act shall be construed to impair or diminish the rights of any
State or the United States to waters under any interstate compact or judicial decree, or to
perm:t appropriations of water under State law which interfere with the fulfillment of treaty
obligations of the United States, or to affect, impair, diminish, or enlarge any existing water
rights in Indians, Indian tribes, or persons claiming under or through them or any Federal
reclamation project heretofore authorized by the United States.
"Sec. 6. Nothing in this act shall be construed as requiring compliance by a department
or agency of the United States with any State low, the effect of which is to treat the United
States less favorably than it treats any person subject to the jurisdiction of the State or to
prohibit or unduly burden the storage, diversion, or development of the waters of an interstate stream or stream system in one State for the benefit of persons in another State.
"Sec. 7. If any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person,
organization, or circumstance shall be held invalid, the remainder of the act and the application of such provision to persons, organizotons, or circumstances other than those as to which
it is held invalid shall not be affected thereby."
40 Assistant Attorney General, Lands Division.
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which has the effect of 'granting or surrendering' such rights to the
federal government in the first place."
In our view, the Colorado doctrine, insofar as it may deny
ownership by the United States of the right to use on its public and
reserved lands the waters which pertain thereto and which are not
the subject of valid prior appropriations, is not legally sound. We
think Mr. Mitchem's suggestion that the validity of the California
doctrine depends upon a state grant or surrender of "such rights to
the federal government in the first place" also misconceives the
facts of history and basic principles of real property and constitutional law.
Ownership of the land within the public land states was originally in the federal government, excepting only those lands which
had passed into private ownership by prior grant from the several
sovereigns by which the cessions to the United States were made.
So far as we know, such ownership has never been denied. There
is no principle more commonly accepted in the field of real prolierty
law than the principle that all titles to these lands must be bottomed
on a grant, in some form, from the United States. It is equally
undisputed that the United States continues to own all of the lands
acquired by cession from other nations which have not been disposed of.
With its ownership of the public lands included within the
several pertinent cessions, the federal government acquired the
right to use and dispose of the lands and all rights pertaining
thereto. The right to use the appurtenant waters was, and is, one
of the whole bundle of rights so acquired. There is no legal basis for
assertions that the right to use the waters on and under the surface
of these lands was, when the lands were acquired, less than or
different from the right to use and extract the minerals or the
right to use the soil itself. The disposition of and the making of all
needful rules and regulations respecting the properties of the
United States, including
these rights, is entrusted to Congress by
41
the Constitution.
The validity of this analysis is supported not only by reason
and fundamental concepts of real property law-it is fully recognized by a long line of legal authorities and by acts of Congress
dating back for nearly 100 years.
41 U.S. Const. art. 4, § 3 (2).
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Kinney, one of the leading authorities on water rights, stated
the following conclusions:
The Government is still the owner of the surplus of the
waters flowing upon the public domain or rather the owner
of all the waters flowing thereon remaining after deducting
the rights to the use of the same which have vested in and
accrued in some legal way to individuals and companies....
It therefore follows, as the result of the ownership by
the United States of the waters flowing upon the public
domain, that any dedication by a State of all the waters
flowing within its boundaries to the State or to the public
amounts to but little, in the face of any claim which may
be made by the Government, at least to all the surplus or
unused waters within such State .... 42
As long ago as 1886, the Supreme Court of California declared:
.. . [S]ince the act of Congress granting or recognizing a
property in the waters actually diverted and usefully applied on the public lands of the United States, such rights
have always been claimed to be deraigned by private persons under the act of Congress, from the recognition accorded by the act, or from the acquiescence of the general
government in previous appropriations
made with its pre4
sumed sanction and approval.

3

And as recently as 1960, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, in denying
the authority's assertion that it had compensable rights to use the
waters of the Grand River under an act of the Oklahoma legislature, declared: "Yet the Federal Government was the initial proprietor in these western lands and any 44claim by a State or by
others must derive from this Federal title.

In refutation of the Colorado doctrine of water rights the
Supreme Court of the United States said:
Although this power of changing the common law
rule as to streams within its dominion undoubtedly belongs
to each State, yet two limitations must be recognized: First,
that in the absence of specific authority from Congress a
State cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream,
to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may
be necessary
for the beneficial uses of the Government
45
property.

Consistently with that language, it held a few years later in
Winters v. United States that: "The power of the Government to
reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under
State laws is not denied, and could not be....

46

Without regard to whether the reservation was for use on an
Indian reservation or for some other purpose of the federal government, it is plain that had the government not already owned the
rights involved in Winters it could not have reserved them. Reser42 1 Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights 692-3 (2d ed. 1912).

43 Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 338, 10 Pac. 674, 721 (1886).
44 363 U.S. 229, 235 (1960).
45 United States v. Rio Grande Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
46 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

DICTA

1962

vation of an interest in real property is legally dependent upon
prior title in the one making the reservation to the interest reserved.
In California-OregonPower Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.
the Court said: "As the owner of the public domain, the Government possessed the power to dispose of 47
' land and water thereon
together, or to dispose of them separately.

By the Desert Land Act of 1877 and its precursor acts of 1866
and 1870, Congress provided for the acquisition from the United
States of rights to use the surplus unappropriated nonnavigable
waters on the public lands in certain states by appropriation in
accordance with local laws and customsY

But these acts were not,

as suggested in Mr. Mitchem's memorandum, "merely ...gratuitous
recognition of appropriation rights that had been acquired under

state law . . ." Rather, they constituted recognition by Congress

that some such action was necessary in order to validate as against
the United States, to the extent of the authorization thereby conferred, possessory rights established in accordance with local laws
and customs. Speaking of section 9 of the 1866 statute, the Supreme
Court said:
The object of the section was to give the sanction of the
United States, the proprietor of the lands, to possessory
rights, which had previously rested solely upon the local
customs, laws, and decisions of the courts, and to prevent
such rights from being lost on a sale of the lands .... The
act . . . continued the system of free mining, holding the

mineral lands open to exploration and occupation, subject
to legislation by Congress and to local rules. It merely recognized the obligation of the Government to respect private
rights which had grown up under its tacit consent and approval. It proposed no new system, but sanctioned, regulated, and confirmed a system already established, to which
the people were attached.
Cong. Globe, 1st sess., 39th Cong.,
4
pt. IV, pp. 3225-3228.

,

In Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, the Supreme Court explained the purpose and effe2t of the 1866, 1870 and 1877 statutes as
follows:
The purpose of the acts of 1866 and 1870 was governmental recognition and sanction of possessory rights on
public lands asserted under local laws and customs. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S.453. The Desert Land Act severed, for
purposes of private acquisition, soil and water rights on
public lands, and provided that such water rights were to be
acquired in the manner provided by the law of the State
of location. CaliforniaOregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142. See also, Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U. S.589, 611-616.50
47 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935). See also United States v. Antanum Irr.Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th
Cir. 1939); United States v. Mclntire, 101 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Conrad Investment Co., 161 Fed. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); Howell v. Johnson, 89 Fed. 556, 558, 559 (C.C.A. Mont. 1898);
Hough v. Porter, 51 Ore. 318, 93 Pac. 1083 (1909); Nevada Ditch Co. v. Bennett, 30 Ore. 59, 45 Pac.
472 (1896).
4s California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
41) (Emphasis

supplied.) Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 456-7, 459 (1878).

5o (Emphasis supplied.) Federal Power Comm'n v. Ore., 349 U.S. 435, 447-8 (1955).
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There are numerous other instances in which Congress itself
has enacted legislation predicated on the right of the United States
to control the use of unappropriated nonnavigable waters on the
public domain. 5'
We have no quarrel with the general proposition that the power
resides in each of the states to enact laws governing the control
and use of waters subject to its jurisdiction. Indeed, this is a fundamental power of the states. But without congressional authorization
consistent with principles of constitutional law, this power can no
more attach to federally owned water rights than it can to federally
owned land. This authority of the states is clearly subject to the
limitations enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Rio Grande
case. 52 And as explained in the quotation from Kinney, 53 the validity
as against the United States of state recognized rights to use the
waters which pertain to the public and reserved lands of 1he federal
government must be based on some
act of Congress and' cannot be
54
predicated on state action alone.
If this were not true, accomplishment of the policy which the
Desert Land Act of 1877 was intended to effectuate would be beyond
the control of Congress. It must be remembered, of course, that the
Desert Land Act was an arid-land adaptation of Congress' land disposition and settlement policy.5 5 The act was devised as a way by
which title to both land and the use of water could be acquired so
that the lands in the designated desert land states could be settled
-just as other areas were and have been settled under the homestead and preemption laws. The act authorized the disposal of lands,
conditioned upon reclamation by irrigation. Water was only incidental, albeit necessary, to the disposal of the public lands involved.
The primary purpose, then, was to facilitate the disposal and settlement by the public of the public lands in the desert land states, not
disposal of the waters of and by themselves.
If the use and acquisition of rights to use the waters pertaining
to those lands were not subject to Congress' control, the U. S. public
land policy in the desert land states would depend entirely on permission of the states. A state, for example, might decide that it
would use all of the waters within its borders for industrial uses,
rather than land reclamation and settlement purposes. And the
main purpose of the Desert Land Act would be thereby completely
frustrated.
We do not attempt to address the policy and possible constitutional questions presented by the proposed bill appended to Mr.
Mitchem's memorandum. As we understand your request, we have
been asked to advise the committee of our views respecting the legal
position stated in Mr. Mitchem's memorandum. As indicated in my
statement to the committee on June 15, 1961, I have serious doubts
as to the wisdom of any indiscriminate abandonment of the very
51 These include the act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stot. 36, 16 U.S.C. § 481; act of June 11, 1906,
ch. 3074, § 3, 34 Stat. 234, 16 U.S.C. § 508; act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847, 43 U.S.C. it
141, 142; act of Dec. 29, 1916, 39 Stat. 865, 43 U.S.C. 1 300; oct of Oct. 22, 1919, 41 Stot. 293, 43
U.S.C. J§ 351.60; act of June 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, 16 U.S.C. § 792.
52 United States v. Rio Grande Irr. Co., supra note 45.
53 1 Kinney, op. cit. supra note 42.
54 See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911);
Cornfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897); San Bernardino v. Rivers'de, 186 Cal. 7, 29-30,
198 Pac. 784 (1921).
55 See California.Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 157, 161 (1935).
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substantial property rights to the use of water which are today the
subject of a great variety of federal reservations. But if it should
be the desire of this or any Congress irrevocably to dispose of those
rights, its legislation, to accomplish that purpose, must be framed in
recognition of the legal principles which establish that these are
property rights owned by the United States. A mere disclaimer
of intention to exercise such rights, as it may have, would not be
sufficient to divest the United States of its title.
The United States' ownership of rights to use water on "acquired" lands is completely different from its ownership of rights
to use water on its public and reserved lands, based on its original
ownership of those lands. I do not understand that such rights are
a matter of concern in the present inquiry. However, Mr. Mitchem's
memorandum suggests that the United States has or may claim
rights to use water on its acquired lands similar to the rights it has
to use water on its public and reserved lands. It is pertinent to note
that, generally speaking, the United States-upon acquisition of
privately owned lands-acquires only such property rights as its
grantor can convey.
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FAIR USE: AS VIEWED BY THE "USER"
By

WILLIAM C. JENSEN*

The scholar is writing a treatise on Elizabethan drama and
would like to quote passages from an earlier work in the field. The
scientist is preparing a paper on a series of organic syntheses he
has performed and would like to set out earlier results obtained
in this area. The literary critic is writing a review of a new
novel and would like to quote its passages for the purpose of
criticism. The humorist is producing a comedy skit in which he
would like to parody a current dramatic Broadway play. If any
of these persons asked, "Do I have a right to make this particular
use of another's material?" the answer under copyright laws of
today would almost surely include a discussion of the complex and
crucial doctrine of "fair use."
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the kind of answer
that the copyright law doctrine of "fair use" gives to those who
ask "Do I have a right to make this particular use of another's
material;" to investigate whether the answer given in light of
our copyright policy is a just and proper one; and, finally, to determine whether a more correct and more certain answer can be insured through legislation.
Investigation of these problems must start with the nature
and source of our copyright laws.

I.

SOURCE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides
the Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it
thinks best. Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but
primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are
given. Not that any particular class of citizens, however
worthy, may benefit, but because the policy is believed
to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in that
it will stimulate writing and invention to give some bonus
to authors and inventors.1
In 1909, the Congress of the United States with the above words
firmly in tow, presented our present Copyright Act 2 to the world.
The significance of these words should not be overlooked, for they
represent the Congressional interpretation of the ultimate source
of all copyright legislation in the United States-the constitutional
provision which authorizes Congress ". . . to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries. ... -3 The constitutional provision and its subsequent
interpretation clearly indicate that the primary purpose of our
copyright laws is to advance the progress of science and the useful
* December groduate, University of Denver, College of tow.
I H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess (1909), reprinted in Howell, The Copyright Law 194,
200 (2ed. 1942).
2 The Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, consolidated and extensively
reformed the existing Federal copyright acts that dated back to the Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15,
1 Stat. 124. The present Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C. (1952), is a codification, with a few minor
revisions, of the Act of 1909.
3 U.S. Const. art. 1, §8, cl.8.
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arts; the securing of benefits to authors being its secondary purpose. 4 The seeds of justification for the doctrine of "fair use" lie
in this particular philosophical attitude towards our copyright laws.
This point will be discussed later.
The right to prevent a person from using the literary products
and works of another is based on Section 1 (a) of the Copyright
Act which states that "Any person entitled thereto, upon complying
with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work."Section 3 of the Act extends this exclusive right to "all the copyrightable component parts of the work protected."6 It is obvious
that the question put by our authors will receive a "yes" answer
when the prior work is not copyrighted, or when there has been
no copying 7 of the copyrighted work, or when the material used
was not a copyrightable component" part of the whole work. If
any of these three factors are present, there will be no invasion
of the literary rights and hence no basis for an infringement proceeding.9 When there is a copying of a protected component of a
copyrighted work without the owner's consent, the answer would
appear to be "no." However, a judicial restriction placed on these
statutory rights may allow the author to go ahead-a judicial
restriction known as "fair use." The response, therefore, must now
be in terms of "fair use"-it may be said that the use of copyrighted
material will be permitted if it is a fair use of such material. 0
4 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
5 17 U.S.C. § l(o) (1952).
The rights of an author in his work, after publication, are entirely
statutory in that such rights can only be insured by compliance with the requrements of the Act.
This problem was first settled in the famous case of Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burrous 2303 (1774),
which was decided 64 years after the passage of the Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19, the
forerunner of all modern copyright legislation. The English court in Donaldson v. Becket held that
an author's common law perpetual right in his work remained only as long as the work was
unpublished and that the terms of the Statute of Anne provided his only protection after publicoton. In Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), the Supreme Court followed the English
view that copyriaht legislation superseded common law rights in published works.
The present
copyright act, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1952), does preserve common low rights in unpublished works; England,
however, has abolished the distinction between common low and statutory rights and has brought
protection of all literary property under its copyright act. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46,
sec. 31.
This paper will discuss only the use of materials from prior published works.
6 17 U.S.C.

§ 3 (1952).

7 A determination of whether a work has been "copied" is a most troublesome one in copyright
low.
In 1909, Congress turned down the opportunity to define the word "copy."
The House of
Representatives Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1909 pointed out that the word "copy"
had been a part of the Copyright Act of 1790 and in view of its being construed so often by the
courts, it seemed undesirable to change or delete the word in the act. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong. 2nd Sets. (1909), reprinted in Howell, The Copyright Law 194, 200 (2ed. 1942). It has been
said that "infringement of a copyright is judicially held to consist in the copying of some substantiol and material part of that as to which the statute affords protection," and to constitute infringement, such copying must be "something which ordinary observations would cause to
be recognized as having been taken from the work of another."
Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690,
691, 692 (2d Cir. 1926).
While the quantity of the work taken has always been important in
determining whether there has been a "copying"
or substantial appropriation, there seem to be
other elements worthy of consideration. See Rossett, Burlesque as Copyright Infringement,
in
ASCAP, Copyright Law Symposium Number Nine 1, 9-13 (1958).
8 It is clear that a copyright does not protect every literary element in a work. There can be
no copyright of facts, Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938),
nor of historical events.
Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.Cal. 1935).
Moreover, it has been said that "theme,"
"plot" and "ideas" are not copyrightable elements; and
it is only the "expression"
of a copyrighted work that is protected. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.,
150 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1943); See Holmes v. Horst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
However, in attempting to separate a work into its
"plot," "theme" or "idea," it is well to keep the words of Judge Hough in mind: " 'Theme' is not
a word of art, and an examination of the cases will show that, where it has been used in decision
writing, it means a great deal more than the jealousy motif on which the fabric of Othello is hung,
or, to go to the other extreme of composition, the theorem of a proposition of Euclid." Dymow v.
Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926).
9 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) reads: "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected
under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable: . . . "
10 See Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174, n. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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RATIONALE OF DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE

Before attempting to determine whether a use of materials in
a particular literary field will be a "fair use," it is necessary to
examine the rationale and primary considerations behind the doctrine of "fair use." More importantly, it can be estimated whether
these considerations have been duly weighed in particular determinations of fair use.
Any judicial limitation placed on a statutory right, such as the
doctrine of "fair use," must have a basis in some important underlying policy. Lord Mansfield stated such a policy for "fair use" in
1785:
In deciding it [the case] we must take care to guard
against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that
men of ability, who have employed their time for the
service of the community, may not be deprived of their
just merits; the other, that the world may not be deprived
of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.
The act that secures copy-right to authors guards against
the piracy of words and sentiments; but it does not prohibit
writing on the same subject."
The use of copyrighted material, then, is permitted when in so
doing the public will benefit from the author's work, without that
use seriously abusing the author's rights. It is a balancing of
interests.
Lord Mansfield's justification for the "fair use" doctrine is in
accord with the constitutional policy of our copyright laws.1 2- The
policy involves the reconciliation of what might seem to be two
conflicting interests: the right of the author to retain complete
control over his works, and the right of the general oublic to
gain the benefit of the work. In a theoretical sense, these two
desires can be said to be consistent, in that the reward granted
the author will induce him to make public the product , of his
intellectual labors. 3 Nevertheless, to the degree that the two
interests are inconsistent in practice' 4 priority must be given to
the public, for "The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration."'; From such a
policy arises the principal rationale for the doctrine of "fair use:"
encouragement of literary and other intellectual works for the
public benefit will be furthered by allowing subsequent authors
and publishers to make a "fair use" of a copyrighted work without the consent of the copyrighted owner. 16 Every determination
of a fair use must ultimately rest on this rationale.
Other rationale have been advanced for the doctrine of "fair
use." It has been suggested that the doctrine is derived from the
11Sayre

v. Moore, 1 East 361, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (K.B. 1785).

12 Supro, notes I and 3.
13 See U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947).
14 See Continental Cos. Co. v. Beardsley, 131 F. Supp. 2832 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
15 U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947).
16 Greenbie y. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D. N.Y. 1957). "The right of subsequent authors
publishers and the general public to use the works of others to a limited extent has always been
universally recognized as consistent with the object of publication and the policy of encouraging the
dissemination of knowledge, learning and culture . . . " Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary
Property 259; as cited in Loew's Inc. y. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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author's "implied consent" to a reasonable use 17 or from those
uses that are "reasonable and customary. 1 8s The "implied consent"
theory, however, seems to be realistic only to the extent that
the facts of a particular case indicate such a consent.1 9 It will
not serve as a rationale for all cases. The "reasonable and customary" theory seems to be nothing more than a statement that what
is "fair" is "reasonable and customary," and hence does not go
beyond the facts in any particular case. In any event, the two
theories are subordinated to, and are a part of the constitutional
rationale; 20 their ability lies in helping judges, in appropriate fact
situations, to implement the constitutional policy.
III.

WHAT

Is

FAIR USE:

ANSWERING THE QUESTION

How then, will the author's question: "may I make this particular use of another's material?" be answered? Whether his use
will be fair is a most difficult problem.2 1 While this question may
be a difficult one, the importance of the doctrine in copyright law
cannot be denied. It is said that the testsstrike a scrupulous balance between the right of the author
to the product of his creative intellect and his imagination
and the right of the public in the dissemination of knowledge and the promotion and progress of science and useful
in which the
arts which is the constitutional mandate
22
American law of copyright originated.
Upon inquiring, the author and potential user would probably discover that what is fair use "depends on the circumstances of the
particular case." 23 Upon further inquiry, he would learn that the
factors considered relevant in a "fair use" case may include: the
17 E.g. Sampson v. Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Rodford, 140 Fed. 539 (1st Cir. 1905); American Institute
of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1941); Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp.
836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
18See Wolf, An Outline Of Copyright lcws 143 cs c'ted in Shcp'ro, Brrnstein & Co. v, P. F.
Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.PQ. 40, Copyr:ght Decisions, Copyright Off. Bull. No. 2C656 (S.D. N.Y.
1934).
19 See American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1941), where the court
found that the au hor of crchitecturcl book forms had consented to their beng put to private use
by people working in the construction business.
20 See Show, Literary Property In The United States 67 (1950). Show finds that the inherent
nature of the copyright laws requrre that on author "dcdicate" a certain part of his work to the
.,.
fair use is cll use dedicated
public in return for his statutory protection. On page 67, he says
to the public by the nature of statutory copyright."
21 Lawrence v. Dona, 15 Fed. Cos. 26, 59 (No. 8, 136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
22 Yonkwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 Chi.L.Rev. 2C3, 213-14 (1954).
23 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 104 (1939): "Fair use may be made of books
or literary works, but what is fair use depends on the circumstances of the particulcr case.
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nature of the material used; the amount of the material used and
its value; the degree to which the new work will lessen the profits
or sales of the prior work; the possibility that the new work will
supersede the objects of the original work;2 4 the proportion of the
25
new work that contains only materials taken from prior works;
the kind of the intellectual area in which the user is working, the
labor and expense of the user saved by taking and using the materials of another;26 the extent to which the user's work and the work
from which he is borrowing are in direct competition;2 7 whether a
person has presumably consented to the use of his works ;2 the
presence of good faith or innocent intention on the part of the
in which the borrowed materials are used
user ;29and the 3manner
11
in the new work.

Obviously the many considerations and variables involved in
the doctrine make easy explanation impossible.
From the standpoint of a person contemplating a use of
another's material, a discussion of the "fair use" elements will be
beneficial only if it can be directed towards his field. Furthermore,
the particular type of use involved is a significant factor in a
fair use determination, 31 and therefore suggests an approach from
the standpoint of the planned use. Finally, and perhaps most important, this approach places emphasis on the constitutional
rationale underlying a determination of what is a "fair use." The
basis of our copyright laws and the constitutional policy behind
them is one of promoting "the progress of the sciences and the
useful arts;" but it is apparent that some areas of endeavor promote
the progress of the sciences and useful arts more than others. It
is therefore clear that a question of what is a 'fair use" requires
that a certain intellectual area or type of use be considered in light
of its social value or merit. This discussion will begin with a
consideration of the law of "fair use" as it has been applied in
certain types of intellectual areas and the particular uses therein
and then briefly reexamine these areas in light of constitutional
and policy considerations-attempting to discover whether the
answers to the author's questions have been correct.
IV.

THE AREA OF LITERARY AND DRAMATIC CRITICISM-THE RIGHT TO
USE THE MATERIAL OF ANOTHER FOR COMMENT AND CRITICISM

The use of materials from copyrighted work for the purposes
of comment and criticism has traditionally been recognized as a
fair use. Justice Story, in 1841, said "Thus, for example, no one can
24 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cos. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
25 Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D.Pa. 1938).
26 Sam-son & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 Fed. 539 (1st Cir. 1910).
W. H. Anderson Co. v. Bdwn
Lcw Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th C;r. 19281
.8 American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
29 Lawrence v. Dona, 15 Fed. Cos. 26 (No. 8, 136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
34)Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, Copyright Decisions, Copyright Off. Bull. No. 20656 (S.D. N.Y. 1934).
27

31 S-e

Public Affairs Associates,

Inc. v. Rickover,

284 F.2d

262

(D.C.

Cir.

1960).

This case

involved a rzqurst for a declar.-tory judgment [action brought] by a publ's rr [for a declaration]
that Admiral Rickover could not restrict the use of quotations from this] public speeches and other

publications that had been distributed prior to his applying for a registration of a claim

for a

copyright. The court heid for the publisher; a question arose as to the right to use for the purpose
of quotation or cr:ticisi,,
materials from those works that were covered by a copyright.
In dis-

cussing this question, Mr. Justice Reed at p. 272 stated:
and appellant

has not presented

a

"Th's

is a suit for declaratory judgment,

copy of the book or pamphlet

it intends to publish.

Nor has it

otherwise unambiguously indicated just what use it plans to make of these later speeches. Without
the planned use before the court, it is, of course, impossible to determrne whether it is fair."
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doubt a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work,
if his design be really and truly to use the passage for the purposes
of fair and reasonable criticism. 3 2 Quoting of the exact text for the
purpose of criticism was early recognized in England to be a fair
33
use.

Use of copyrighted work for the purposes of criticism does

not seem to be confined to literary criticism only. It has been said
that this type of fair use also extends to dramatic criticism, editorial
comment, and to mimicry and parodies. 34 However, it is doubtful
whether mimicry and parody are given automatic acceptance by
the courts as an instance of fair use.
The fact that there are few reported cases on the question
of quotation for criticism being a "fair use" indicates that the particular type of practice is well accepted. While of no legal significance, publishers often place a notice in newly published books
to the effect that a particular amount of the material may be
quoted for purposes of comment and criticism.
The recent case of Alexander v. Irving Trust Co. 35 presents an
element not usually found in a determination of "fair use" as it
relates to editorial comment and criticism. In this case the plaintiff
alleged that a two-page article she had caused to be published in a
medical journal, entitled "Oliver Wendell Holmes, Psychiatrist,"
was infringed by defendant's 270 page book entitled "The Psychiatric Novels of Oliver Wendell Holmes." The court found no appropriation; at the most there was only a borrowing of ideas. One of
plaintiff's contentions was that the quotations on the dust jacket of
the defendant's book invaded her legal rights because they stated
that the book was a "novel contribution" and presented "hitherto
unsuspected knowledge" on the work of Holmes. The court found
that the statements were "a fair use of comments made by third
parties concerning the defendant's work."3 6 The usual determination
of fair use concerns the originator of certain work and the one
who borrows from him. The court here seems to indicate that the
quotations used were "fair" in that they did not injure a third
party's (i.e., plaintiff's) rights. This determination of "fair use"
seems more akin to tort law than to copyright law.3 7
However, it is clear that the right of comment and criticism
is limited to what is reasonable. In Folsom v. March,3 the defendant
had published a book on the life of George Washington, copying
353 of its 866 pages from a previous work by the plaintiff on Washington. In answer to the defendant's assertion that this taking
was for the purpose of criticism, the court pointed out that if
important parts of the book were cited, not for purpose of criticism,
but for the purpose of superseding the use of the original work,
it would be a piracy.1 ' A finding of unfair use is often made in
32 Folsam v. Marsh, supra note 24, at 343.
33 Bell v. Whitehead, 3 Jurist 68 (1839).
34 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. Inc. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co. 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, Copyright Decis'ons,
Copyright Off. Bull. No. 20656, 658 (S.D. N.Y. 1934). (dictum). "Dramatic criticism is one of the
most common forms of 'fair use.' Mimicry, editorial comment, and parodies are other varieties or
instances of 'fair use'."
35 132 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. N.Y. 1955), aff'd per curiam 228 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 996 (1956).
36 Id. 132 F. Supp. at 369.
37 The privilege of fair comment or criticism in copyright law is analogous to the libel and
slander law privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern. For a discussion of the libel
and slander privilege, see Prosser, Torts § 95 (1955).
38 9 Fed. Cos. 343 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
39 Ibid.
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cases where the new work will tend to become a substitute for the
a resulting unjust deprivation of the original author's
original-with
40
rights.
V.

THE AREA OF LEGAL, SCIENTIFIC AND OTHER SCHOLARLY W6RK

The person desiring to use materials from prior works in this
field is given extensive leeway. The extent of the "fair use" doctrine in this field is indicated by the following statement: "This
doctrine permits a writer of scientific, legal, medical and similar
books or articles of learning to use even the identical words of earlier books or writing dealing with the same subject matter. '41 This
latitude afforded workers in the scientific, legal and medical fields
is a well established one. 42 Futhermore, it seems that courts will go
a long way in finding that a particular field is scientific or professional. In Sims v. Stanton,43 it was stated that "physiagnomy, the art
of reading faces, deserved recognition as a science" (in finding that
there was a fair use made of the plaintiff's work on this subject).
While it is true that facts, theories and ideas that have been
set down in prior works can be used since they are not copyrightable,44 and that certain uses of the exact words of the prior work
are proper, 45 elements appear which will limit such use.
The first element is competition. In one case 15% of the
word lists in a French Language book were used by the defendant
in his book-a book that was in competition with the prior work.
This was held to exceed the bounds of fair use.46 In a similar case
a certain type of alphabet groupings for Russian letters, unique
to the plaintiff's book, were used by the defendant in his Russian
language work. The appropriated lists made up only a small part
of the defendant's book, but the court found that such appropriation
was not a fair use, especially in view of the fact that the books
were in competition. The court also mentioned that there had been
no independent effort made on the part of the defendant in his
word groupings. 47 But this element, in the absence of a competitive
to cases involving dicfactor, is probably more properly 4confined
8
tionaries, form books, and the like.
One of the most troublesome problems in this area has been
the determination of fair use in those instances where citations,
case abstracts, and case lists from legal books have been used
in similar legal books. 49 The problem arises, in part, from the
necessity to classify the various legal publications by their essential
40 See Macmillan v. King, 223 Fed. 862 (D.C. Mass. 1914); Ginn & Co. v. Apollo Pub. Co., 215
Fed. 772 (E.D. Mass. 1914).
41 Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
42 See W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Low Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); West Publishing
Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 1910); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. SeaverRadford Co., 140 Fed. 539 (1st Cir. 1905).
43 75 Fed. 6 (N.D. Col. 1896). See also Eisenchiml v. Fawcett Publications Inc., 246 F.2d 598,
604 (2d Cir. 1957) where the court treated a True Magazine article on the death of Lincoln as a
"historical writing."
44 Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938).
45 Supro note 41.
46College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1941).
47 Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 246 F.2d 501 (2d.Cir. 1957).
48 See Weathersby and Sons v. international Horse Agency and Exchange, Ltd., 2 Ch. 297 (1910);
Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co.. 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
49 The cases are difficult to reconcile. See W. H. Anderson Co. a. Baldwin Low Pub. Co., 27
F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); West Pub. Co. v. Lawyers Co-op Pub. Co., 79 Fed. 756 (2d Cir. 1897);
Edward Thompson Co. v. Am. Law Book Co., 122 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1903); West Pub. Co. v. Edward
Thompson Co., 176 Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 1910).
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nature-whether they are textbooks in the professional sense or
whether they are mere lists and compilations. From a policy
standpoint, greater appropriation should be permitted from text50
books and treatises than from mere compilations or digests.
The fact that the digests, containing case lists and annotations,
are in direct competition with each other is another reason for
limiting the copying of case lists and annotations from prior works.
50 In W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Low Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82, 89 (6th Cir. 1928), it was said:
. . . greater latitude is to be expected in the case of authors consulting other text books or
using directories and lists than in the case of one compiler attempting to make use of another
similar compilation."
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Novels and biographies fit into the literary and scientific fields.
In Toksuiq v. Bruce Pub. Co., 51 an action for infringement involved
two biographies of Hans Christian Anderson. It was alleged that
the second work was an infringement of the prior biography in
that the defendant had taken certain ideas, themes, and a few
quotations from the first work. It was found that such a use allowed
the defendant to write the book without going to all the Danish
sources. This was held to be an unfair use, the court stating that
the test for determining a fair use is "whether the one charged
with infringement has made an independent production, or made a
substantial and unfair use of the complainant's work. '52 Another
case involving biographies found no infringement, the emphasis
appearing to be on the policy ' 5 of
promoting the arts rather than
3
on "labor saving consideration.
The emphasis on labor-saving devices, as mentioned before,

does not seem justified in cases in this area. This element is important when the works consist of mere lists or forms, for there
it would appear that the principle value of an author's property
is the labor that he expended in producing the works. In scholarly
areas, where the promotion of the arts is the paramount concern,
this factor should not be stressed.
VI.

BUSINESS AREA-USES FOR COMMERCrAL PURPOSES

In moving from the scholarly to the commercial area, it can
be seen that the use of another's material will generally be more
restricted. This is because the profit and competitive factors are
more prevalent here. Substitution often appears. In a case where a
book giving the history of popular songs in the United States
contained the words and melody line of a copyrighted song, it
was held that the book provided a substitute for the song, even
though the song was no longer popular, and therefore the use
was not fair. 54 The copying of a chorus of a copyrighted song belonging to a rival and competing publishing company was held to
be unfair; 55 the use of a news item of a rival newspaper (involving
a substantial copying of56 the literary style of the item) was held
to be an infringement.
57
In Associated Music Publishersv. Debs Memorial Radio Fund,
the defendants claimed that the broadcasting of the plaintiff's
copyrighted composition was for the ultimate purpose of raising
funds for a charitable organization set up in honor of the late
Eugene Debs. However, it was found that the money for the fund
was to come in part from the radio station's profits and that the
broadcast was for the purpose of building up a listening audience so
that profits might be realized. The defendant's claim of fair use
was rejected.
In other commercial cases, the doctrine of de minimis non curat
51 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 195').
52 Id. at 667.
53 Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. N.Y. 1957). This case involved a biography and
a magazine article on a famous woman in the Civil War.
54 Sayers v. Spaeth, Copyright Decisions, Copyright Off. Bull. No. 20,625 (S.D. N.Y. 1932).
55 Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1939).
56 Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n, 275 Fed. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).
57 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944).
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lex has apparently been applied in excusing small appropriations
of another's copyrighted work. 58
Cases involving uses for the purposes of advertising have not
looked with favor on the defense of fair use. Perhaps the leading
case5 9 in the field is Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobbaco
Co.,

where three sentences from a doctor's work on the human

voice were quoted, with credit, in a cigarette advertising pamphlet.
The quoted parts made up one-twentieth of the pamphlet. The
amount of material appropriated was small and there was no competition between the pamphlet and the book. The court held that
the use was unfair, pointing out that the doctor was damaged in
that it would appear he had commercialized his work, thereby
retarding the sale of his book in academic and medical areas. 6
Similarly, other cases have found an unfair use where the advertising use constituted an appropriation of a valuable and essential
part of the plaintiff's work."'
Cases involving the use of business forms are examples of situations where the rationale of "implied consent" in fair use is relevant
and realistic. The courts can readily find that the use of the form
is to be expected, is impliedly consented to, and is in fact the sole
reason for the preparing of the form. In a case involving forms attached to ledger books, the United States Supreme Court said, "...
the teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful #art
have their final end in application and use; and their application
and use are what the public derives from the publication of a book
that teaches them. '62 Cases involving architectural forms 63 and insurance forms 64 have followed this reasoning; the cases in this general area hold that the public is
entitled to copy and use the very
65
outline and words of the form.
Before leaving this area, it is important to note those situations
involving the use of copyrighted material for an "incidental" or
"background" purpose. There are at least three reported cases involving the use of copyrighted song lyrics in a magazine article. In
Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co.,66 a magazine article on the Green Bay
Packers contained the lyrics of a song written by a Packer fan who
had dedicated it to the football team. This was held to be a fair use,
the court finding a mere incidental use and one to which the songwriter had implicitly consented. 67 Two other cases involved the use
of song lyrics as a background or setting in a magazine article; in
58'See Kane v. Penna. Broadcasting Co., 73 F. Supp. 307 (D.C.D. Pa. 1947) (radio broadcast used
small portions of plaintiff's pamphlet on historical facts). Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Hobaro
Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). Defendant's sales bulletin for salesmen's use quoted
portions of plaintiff's consumers research magazine which had criticized some of the features of
dishwasher manufactured by the defendant. The portions were quoted for the purpose of attacking
the conclusions reached by the consumer magazine.
59 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
60 Id. at 304.
61 Conde Nast Pub., Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling Inc., 105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. N.Y.
1952) (advertising brochure for modelling school contained substantial reproduction of Vogue
magazine cover). Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal.
1946) (A singing beer commercial used the parts of plaintiff's copyrighted song upon which rested
the successand popular appeal of the song).
62 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).
63 Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
64 American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S. D. N.Y. 1941).
65 Crume v. Poc. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cr. 1944).In speaking of a business form,
this court, at 184, stated, "Its use, to which the public is entitled, con be effected solely by the employment of words descriptive thereof."
6639 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
6T Id. at 837.
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each, there was a finding of fair use.68 The reasoning of the courts
in these decisions seems justified in that the use of the materials
did not economically harm the plaintiff nor did the article serve
as a substitute for his song. The point here is that the use was made
for the purpose of setting a background and in no way affected any
economic rights that the author had or may still have had in the
songs themselves.
VII.

THE AREA OF PARODY-USE OF MATERIALS FOR PURPOSE OF
BURLESQUE OR PARODY

Rules governing the application of the doctrine of "fair use" in
in the area of parody and burlesque have not been clearly established by the courts. There have only been a few cases on the problem. Furthermore, the existing cases have, in a strict literary sense,
only dealt with what is known as "burlesque," and have not decided
questions concerning true "parody." 69 However, the two terms will
be used interchangeably here, in that both signify a type of intellectual or artistic creation apart from the borrowed work.
To begin with, at least three of the cases in this area involved
a mimicry or "take off" which, strictly speaking, was not a use of
a copyrightable component part of a work. In Bloom & Hamlin v.
Nixon,70 the defendant mimicked the gestures and mannerisms of
a popular singer of the day, using the copyrighted chorus of a song
identified with the popular artist. The court held that gestures and
mannerisms in a performance were not copyrightable. The use of
the chorus of the copyrighted song was held to be "incidental" and
a mere vehicle for the mimicry performance. 71 The court also said,
by way of dictum, that the good faith of the mimicry
was essential
if there was to be a finding of non-infringement. 72
Two other cases concerned the mimicking of popular singers
and actresses. Infringement was found in one where the mimic had
used an entire copyrighted song as her "taking off point; '73 in the
other there was no evidence showing a substantial using of a copyrighted song.74 Neither of the cases involved a burlesque of an actual copyrighted work-the use of the songs was incidental to the
burlesque.
In Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc.,757 the defendant put on a

stage performance involving two characters named "Nutt and Giff,"

6A Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, Copyright Decisions, Copyright
Off. Bull. No. 20,656 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R. Pub. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817
(S.D. N.Y. 1940). (In this case the chorus of the song constituted 50% of the total article).
69 See Macdonald, Parodies, An Anthology From Chaucer To Beerbohm-And After 557-68 (1960).
In the appendix to the Anthology, Macdonald sets out some definitions for the various forms of
"humor" generally referred to as "parody." He defines travesty as a form that " . . . raises laughs,
from the belly rather than the head, by putting high, classic characters into prosaic situations, with
o corresponding stepping-down of the language." He says that burlesque "...
imitates the style of
the original" and "it differs from parody in that the writer is concerned with the original not in
itself but merely on a device for topical humor." Parody is said to " . . . concentrate on the style
and thought of the original" and "at its best, it is a form of literary criticism."
In many instances, classification following the definition above would be difficult. If however,
we take parody to mean a type of literary criticism, we have a traditional situation for the application of the "fair use" doctrine. The absence of any reported cases concerning "parody" (as defined
by Macdonald) suggests that this type of use has always been considered "reasonable and customary"
-a "fair use." The cases that hove been reported in this area seem, for the most part, to fall under
Macdonald's definition of "burlesque."
70 125 Fed. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
71 Id. at 978.
72 Ibid.
73 Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 Fed. 286 (S.D. N.Y. 1909).
74 Green v. Luby, 177 Fed. 287 (S.D. N.Y. 1909).
75 220 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
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who were presented in the garb and spoke in the manner of Mutt
and Jeff, the cartoon characters. The court held that this went beyond a parody and in fact became a substitute for Mutt and Jeff,
thereby reducing the demand for the Mutt and Jeff works.76 As
shown above, the element of substitution or harm to the plaintiff

through a reduction in demand 7for
his works is a compelling reason
7
for a refusal to find a fair use.
Two recent decisions involving television burlesque or skits of
movies constitute the only real case law on the question of burlesque
being a fair use. In Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,7
an injunction was granted enjoining Jack Benny from parodying
the movie Gaslight on his television program. The parody closely
followed the plot, dramatic incidents, and the expression of the
original movie. The court found that there was a substantial copying and appropriation of the movie-beyond the realm of fair use.
The court emphasized the commercial factor involved in the television skit, finding that fair use is more restricted in a commercial
area than in areas of science and art. The judge did not treat parody
as a particular instance of a valuable art and literary form which
could call for a more liberal application of the "fair use" doctrine.
76 Id. at 360. The court said: "A copyrighted work is subject to fair critic'sm, serious Cr humorous,"
but that such a use would not be permitted when the result will be to "mater:ally reduce the demand
for the originol." The court also said that the reduction in demand must result from the fcct that
the use constituted a substitute; that mere adverse criticism, even if it reduced the demand, would not
be an unfair use.
77 See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 3C2 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
78 131 F. Supo. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub. noma. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532
(9th Cir.1956), aff'd without opinion by equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
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The Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co. 9 case
involved a Sid Caesar skit entitled "From Here to Obscurity"-a
burlesque of the movie From Here to Eternity. In this case the plot
was altered considerably in the skit, characters were deleted, and
the dramatic incidents combined. The parody seemingly served as
a mere vehicle for Sid Caesar pratfalls. Judge Carter, who had decided the Jack Benny case, also decided this one. He found for the
defendant. In this case, he stated that the doctrine of "fair use"
would permit some taking in order to "conjure up, at least'the general image, of the original"8 0 in the minds of the audience.
The two decisions are not entirely consistent. The doctrine of
"fair use" was never seriously considered in the Benny case-its
application in the Caesar decision does not indicate whether it could
ever be applicable in a situation like the Benny case. More important, parody is not given express recognition as an art form in either
case; the uses were treated as uses in a commercial area. These two
decisions have not succeeded in determining the true application
of fair use in parody and burlesque situations. To the extent that
they hinder the doctrine's use, the cases seem undesirable.
VIII. A
IN

REEXAMINATION OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
LIGHT OF OUR COPYRIGHT LAW POLICY

Having examined the principle areas of copyright law in which
the doctrine of "fair use" is applied, it must now be determined
whether the answers that our authors have received have been correct in view of the fair use rationale.
Our constitutional policy requires that the judicial process in
copyright law give primary attention to the advancement of "science
and the useful arts." This necessitates some type of value judgment
in the area of endeavor being considered. Traditionally, this has
been done. The fields of science and learning are considered to be
of greater value and worth to our culture than the field of advertising, and therefore, more deserving of encouragement. Consequently, one is allowed greater freedom to use the materials in the
scientific than in the commercial areas.
Generally speaking, the fields that have been historically considered beneficial to the advancement of learning are recognized
and given due weight in copyright law. However, the two recent
parody cases are examples of a failure to give proper recognition
and consideration to a field that has been long deemed a desirable
form of artistic creation."l In denying its place in our culture, and
in refusing to expressly apply the doctrine of "fair use" to its activities, the cases have restricted its growth.
It is submitted that the same results in the cases could have
been reached through application of the "fair use" doctrine. The
right to recognition as a distinct literary area could have been
granted without opening the door to infringement. First of all,
neither parody presented competition or caused economic harm to
79 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Ca?. 1955).
90 Id. at 350.
81 See Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 Can. Bar Rev. 1130-37 (1955)
for a discussion of parody's well established place in world literature. Also see Macdonald, supra
note 69.
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the movies from which they borrowed. In fact, each parody probably helped popularize the particular borrowed work.
Secondly, the Benny case presented elements that usually mitigate against the application of the "fair use" doctrine. It can be said
that the parody here did not constitute a new work; little in the
way of original material was added. This is a substantial appropriaeconomic
tion of the plaintiff's labor, even though he
82 has suffered no
harm, and so is probably not a fair use.

Conversely, Caesar's use of the material from the From Here
to Eternity movie can be classified as an "incidental" use. The material taken was used for a different purpose ("taking-off point"
for jokes and slapstick) in the skit than in the movie. The incidents
borrowed evoked different emotional responses in the skit than
they did within the movie's framework. The humor of the skit did
not compete with the dramatic moods of the movie. As such, the
use is similar to the8 3incidental and background uses of song lyrics
in magazine articles.
The fact that a just result was reached without relying on the
fair use doctrine is not a justification for not applying it. The precedents of the decisions, especially the Benny one, may seriously
restrict proper use in parody fields in the future.
In summary, it would appear that, with the exception of the
areas of parody and burlesque, the doctrine of "fair use" is being
applied with the constitutional rationale behind the doctrines well
in mind. It is hoped that the future brings the application of the
rationale to all fields of copyright endeavor.
CONCLUSION

The examination of the doctrine of "fair use" is now completed.
The source and rationale of the doctrine has been discussed and its
application to various areas investigated. The law's answer to the
question: "May I make this particular use of another's material?"
has been, with the exception of the parody area, a proper one. Legislation must now be considered.
A case for laboratory study in the consideration of codification
of the "fair use" doctrine is Hawkes & Son, Ltd. v. ParamountFilm
Service, Ltd.8 4 This case was decided under the British "fair dealing"
statute, which provided that the following shall not constitute an
infringement of a copyright: "Any fair dealing with any work for
purposes of private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper
summary. 8s 5 The action arose at a hospital opening in England
where a newsreel company was filming the events of the opening.
In taking pictures of a boys' military band, there came on to the
soundtrack of the film twenty-eight bars of the "Colonel Bogey"
March, which the boys were playing. The owner of the copyright
on the march sued. for infringement. A lower court judge found no
82 See Weatherby & Sons v. Internat'l Horse Agency and Exchange, Ltd., 2 Ch. 297 (1910).
83 Cases cited, supra note 68. Sid Caesar's selection of only a few dramatic incidents from
Eternity movie for use in his skit would correspond with the definition of burlesque as given by
Frank Baxter, who testified, as on expert on parody and burlesque in the Benny case.
Baxter described burlesque as a technique by which reference is made to one or two or more of
incidents in the original for purposes of identification, and then the burlesque "takes off into
blue" with its own story or plot. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165,
n. 48 (1955). 84 1 Ch. 593 (1943).
84 1 Ch. 593 (1934).
85 Copyright Act, 1911,1 & 2 Geo. 5 c.46 (s. 261) proviso(i).
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substantial appropriation or, in the alternative, a "fair dealing."
The appellate court found that there was a taking which was not
excused under the fair dealing statute. One judge, to his "regret,"8 6
found that there was an infringement, even though he felt there
was no injury-he could not bring the taking under the "fair dealing" statute. The "regretable" decision here was not necessarily the
result of an inherent evil in codification. A phrase covering incidental newsreel shots in the statute would have saved the day for the
defendant. However, the view of the judges appeared to indicate
a basic flaw in such a statute. Under this provision it is still necessary to decide whether the quantity or quality of that taken was
fair or unfair. The interpretation of the word "fair" is still left to
the court. Consequently it would seem that legislation is not the
answer.
The answer to the question, and the correction of mistakes in
the application of the doctrine of "fair use," must ultimately be
sought in the judicial process. What has been pointed out here, and
contended for, in the judicial process, is a more conscious alignment
with the constitutional rationale behind fair use. This means a consideration for the advancement of the arts and an accompanying
expansion of the "fair use" doctrine where the needs of society and
the interest of progress call for them. Judge Palmieri has observed:
The general purposes of copyright protection are to afford
authors the right to reap the fruits of their expression and
to promote the store of information and objects of culture
available for public enjoyment and application. Usually
these two purposes are not' inconsistent. When, however,
an author's monopoly threatens to infringe unduly on public use of the ideas or objects of that expression, the courts
have demonstrated flexibility in adjusting the conflicting
theories. Thus copyrightability may be altogether denied,
or, if copyright is upheld, restrictively protected by requiring almost verbatim copying to constitute infringement.
In other situations, the subject and purpose of copyright
may be explicitly defined so as not to authorize an overrestrict fair use of the
generalized monopoly which would
87
disclosed information or objects.
SO Hawkes and Son, Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service, Ltd., 1 Ch. 593, 608 (1934).
87 Continental Cos. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 31-32 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
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THE TORRENS TITLE SYSTEM IN COLORADO
By

RICHARD W.

LAUGESEN*

The present day observer cannot but smile when he reads the
preamble to the 1858 Real Property Act of South Australia.1 This
statute was the first enactment into law of Sir Robert Torrens'
theories on land tenure. The preamble reads:
Whereas the inhabitants of the Province of South Australia are subjected to losses, heavy costs, and much perplexity, by reason that the laws relating to the transfer
and encumbrance of freehold and other interests in land
are complex, cumbrous, and unsuited to the requirements
of said inhabitants, it is therefore expedient to amend the
laws.
Torrens introduced his theories to the Legislative Council of
South Australia in the form of a private member's bill. He was,
at the time of its introduction, Collector of Customs at Port Adelaide, and his duties gave him good opportunity to become familiar
with the Merchant Shipping Act of South Australia.2 This act, with
its provisions for the orderly transaction of sales of merchant ships,
was conceded by Torrens to have formed the model for his landregistry system. The thesis of his plan was to make the conveyancing of title to3 land as cheap and simple as the transfer and ownership of ships.
The first registration statute voiced the essential principles
conceived by Torrens as being the answer to the needs of his day.These same basic principles are in force in a number of jurisdictions
today. Proof of the validity of these concepts, at least in theory, is
evidenced by the fact of their adoption and successful use in a host
and territories,5 and at least sixteen states of
of foreign countries
6
this country.
In order to accomplish the objectives of (1) certainty of title,
(2) simplicity and (3) inexpensiveness of operation, a system was
established under governmental control for registration of title to
land itself rather than registration of the documents or deeds
merely evidencing title. Simplified forms of leases and mortgages
were provided for. Under the Torrens system, once title was initially determined to be in a certain person, a decree in rem was
rendered to that effect and an initial certificate of title was entered
in the record books provided for that purpose, the owner receiving
a duplicate copy.
All subsequent transactions creating interests in or encumbrances on land were to be recorded on the face of the original
* December graduate, University of Denver College of Low.
1 "An Act to Simplify the laws relating to and Encumbrance of Freehold and other Interests in
Lond," 21 Vict., No. 15 (1858).
2 17 and 18 Vict., ch. 104 (1854).
3 Registration of automobile titles in Colorado provides the best and most understcncoble presentday analogy to what Torrens had in mind.
4 There has been no substantial change in the South Australian Act for over 100 years. Many
acts are patterned from it.
5 Australia, New Zealand, England, Ireland, Irish Free State, Philipines, and several Latin
American countries.
6 In order of adoption: Illinois, Ohio, California, Massachusetts, Oregon, Minnesota, Colorado,
Washington, New York, North Carolina, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia,
North Dakota, South Dakota and Hawaii. Some of the states have repealed their low in recent
years. 6 Powell, Real Property § 922 (2d ed. 1958).
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certificate. When a conveyance was made, the old certificate was
cancelled and a new one drawn with all the lesser estates or liens
which appeared on the face of the old certificate as still subsisting
carried forward and entered on the new certificate. In this way, the
condition of the title to particular property could at any time be
determined easily and quickly by prospective purchasers, mortgagees and creditors. Torrens intended that, if necessary, even a
layman could carry out land transactions without intervention of
a skilled conveyancer or attorney.7
I.

THE PROBLEM DEFINED

The difference between this radically new registration of title
process and the systems then in effect can readily be appreciated.
Under the ordinary deed system, a person dealing with land relied
on an examination of the chain of documents produced by the
vendor in order to establish that the vendor had good title to the
land. The cumbersome task of examining and evaluating the instruments, and the very apparent risk of an important instrument not
being produced, made this system a hazardous one for prospective
purchasers or mortgagees.
A second system was also in use, and is still favored in many
areas of the world. This was also a deed system, but required that
all documents relating to land be recorded in a government office.
Such a system eliminated the second hazard of the ordinary deed
system, in that no document was of any effect as to third persons
unless recorded in a specified place. Because the statutes establishing the recording system have almost invariably been regarded as
intended for the protection of subsequent purchasers only, failure
to record in no way affected the passing of title between the parties
thereto8 Many risks still remained because some interests did not
need to be recorded, and the mere recording of a prior instrument
did not make it valid.9
Some of the shortcomings of the recording system concerning
elements upon which title may depend were, and in many jurisdictions still are, as follows: "I
(1) There are usually no means of verifying the genuineness
of signatures, either of grantors or witnesses.
(2) In case of intestate death of the owner, the decree of
the court is not necessarily conclusive as to who are the
heirs. A subsequent purchaser must determine this at his
peril. 1
(3) The fact that a deed appears of record is only prima
facie evidence of delivery.
(4) Even an unrecorded deed will ordinarily be effectual
to those with actual notice of it.
(5) Questions of incapacity to contract are not determined
by the recording of the deed.
7 One of the earliest descriptions of the Torrens System was written by James Edward Hogg in
1905 and can be found in his book, The Australian Torrens System. For a more recent evaluation
see Patton, Evolution nf Legislation on Proof of Title to Land, 30 Wash. L. Rev. 224 (1955).
85 Tiffany, Real Property § 1262 (Perm. ed. 1939). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-6-9 (1953).
9tFor example: forged instruments.
1) There is no such thing as a perfect record title. See Chaplin, Record Title to Land, 6 Harv. L.
Rev. 302 (1892).
11 Most jurisdictions take care of this problem by a short statute of limitation. See Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 152-5-39 (Supp. 1960).
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(6) Questions of marriage and divorce may enter into the
status of title. Since recordation is usually very localized in
nature, and jurisdiction of a court in divorce proceedings
is not always clearly established, much doubt is inherently
built in to the recording system in this regard.
(7) Prescription and adverse possession do not appear of
record.
(8) Buyers of devised land take the risk of an unknown
and undiscovered later will.12

(9) The purchaser at a foreclosure sale particularly takes
the risk of many unascertainable factors and unrecorded
elements material to the title.
Generally, time and expense preclude an accurate search into most
of the above matters. The individual purchaser must
decide
13
how far in his title determination he can afford to go.
A third so-called system prevalent today, at least in urban
areas, is the "abstract" system.1 4 By this method, a permanent,
indexed manuscript record of all transactions, conveyances and
encumbrances on the land is made. This record theoretically discloses every scrap of evidence pertaining to the title at any given
point in time. Here, however, the search is merely shifted from the
records at the court house to a bundle of papers the prospective
vendee has purchased at considerable cost.1 " The manuscript must
be brought up to date and an experienced conveyancing lawyer
must be hired to make the search. As under the recording system
of which this method is a part, the purchaser concludes at his peril
the marketability of his vendor's title. The same pitfalls inherent in
the recording system 6 await the purchaser under this method.
In recent years the uncertainty of title aspect of the above
systems has been aided by the advent of "title insurance." It usually
does not make title more certain but does indemnify the disillu12 Bona fide purchasers are protected in Colorado.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-5-38 (Supp. 1960).

13 Probably one of the most futile characteristics inherent in the recordina system is the endless
useless reoetition of work. Although the great majority of titles are marketable, this cannot be
known until the laborious and exhaustive search of numerous records has been completed.
14 This method of evidencing title is an outgrowth of the recording system. Indexing by tract
makes it a much more efficient operation, however. It is in wide use in the middle west and ports
of the Western United States. See the excellent discussion of its use, value and limitations in 1
King, Colorado Practice Methods, ch. 3 (1956).
15 An abstract of title is considered valuable personal property; values can range upward to
$200 or mare. It should be noted that an abstract of title is necessary in the initial registration
process.

Infra note 30.

10 Supra note 10.
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sioned purchaser after a loss of rights resulting from a defect therein. The coverage is, of course, subject to limitations dependent upon
the type of policy, coverage and corresponding premium invested
title search still remains a neby the purchaser. The cumbersome
cessity and is not eliminated. 17
II. A

POSSIBLE REMEDY OPPOSED

In this country, despite the enthusiastic approval of learned
writers in the field of real property,18 title registration has, not been
widely successful. In many states where it has been adopted as
an alternative means of title regulation,' 9 the Torrens law has been
used comparatively infrequently. Among the many factors contributing to this disinclination to utilize the system are vigorous
opposition from title insurance companies and their oft-time allies
the abstract companies, banks and mortgage houses; 20 wide spread
ignorance of the very fact of its existence on the part of property
owners; 21 and hostility of members of the legal profession based
in the law and unfamilargely upon traditional apathy to changes
22
liarity with the registration procedure.
It is understandable why large abstract companies and title
insurance corporations have opposed the method. A carefully written, wisely administered land registration act, with an easily reachable and adequate assurance fund, would almost obviate their
existence. It is difficult to believe, however, that fear of pecuniary
loss is the sole, or even primary, reason for the opposition of lawyers. Certainly, the change-over would be, at most, a mere shift in
emphasis for them.
Even if this potential dislocation would be a major consideration in the adoption of an overall compulsory system, it is unfortunate that this somewhat subjective attitude must impede an even,
of a quite worthy alternative method of title
gradual progress
23
regulation.
Other legal and psychological bases for the system's practical
failure are apparent in more subtle form. Legal considerations
would include the ever-existent minor flaws and uncertainties prevalent in any piece of legislation. 4 On the psychological side, certain motivating factors are quite cogent. Especially in the case of
residential property, one holding land or contemplating its purchase
17 A title search is usually required before the title is insurable, but the search is usually made
by title insurance company attorneys. See King, Colorado Practice Methods § 129 (Supo. 1961).
18 See 2 Patton, Titles, ch. 14 (2d ed. 1957); 6 Powell, Real Property, ch. 83 (1958). Advantages
of the Torrens system are indicated in McDougall and Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 Yale .J. 1125 (1929); Patton, The Torrens System of Land Title Registration, 19 Minn. L.Rev.
519 (1935).
19 Title registration is not compulsory in any state. Which system will be used is entirely optional
w th the land owner. The Torrens law, however, is the exclusive mode of title regulation in
Australia where the theory originated.
20 There would appear to be support of title insurance companies by other title dealing or
financing institutions chiefly because of financial alliances.
21 The layman can hardly be expected to appreciate and understand a new and technical procedural device for registering titles if the only professional group to which he can turn for advice
and education has not intelligently informed itself as to the operation of the law.
22 Born of a lack of knowledge and fed by the age old disinclination to forsake the old ways
and hazard the new, the proud and stubborn urge to protect and perpetuate the traditional ways
has had the heaviest impact on the growth of the Torrens system.
23 Title registration is an optional alternative method of title regulation. In no state is it
compulsory. It should be looked upon as a useful tool to be applied where appropriate and as
actually complementary to existing methods. Unfortunately, too many view it as a threat.
24 As complex as is the transfer of interests in land, no system of regulation could ever be
perfect in all respects. The Torrens law has definite weak spots. A few of the more important ones
cra discussed at note 82, infra.
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is inclined to think of himself and not the well-being of his anonymous future vendee. Resale will be, in many cases, of no immediate
concern and may not even be considered. Since an incontestable
title will, as a practical matter, have no higher value than one resting on the record, the fact that a future transfer of land will be
cost to the purchaser
effectuated much more quickly and at smaller
2 5
is likely to be of small present interest.
III.

OPERATION

OF THE COLORADO TORRENS SYSTEM

Generally, the Colorado act, patterned after the original South
Australian act has three basic aspects:
(1) There is a judici al determination of title similar to
quiet title, rendering an adjudication absolute against all
parties, resident and non-resident. The state, with certain
limitations, guarantees the title and operates the system's
machinery.
(2) Transactions thereafter must all be registered
against the title in the state-operated land titles office, and
they are not valid in the form of mere instruments executed
parties as against other competing registered interby the
26
ests.
The certificate of title is intended to be the complete
and accurate reflection of the result of all preceding transactions affecting the property. Persons dealing with a registered proprietor do not therefore have to look elsewhere
to search a few statutory excepthan the certificate, except
27
tions to indefensibility.
(3) An assurance fund is provided whereby persons
who, through no fault of their own have valuable rights
cut off by the registration decree, may be compensated. Th's
fund 28is created by a small fee charged for registering the
land.
A. Initial Registration
The initial adjudication is the cornerstone of the entire Torrens
system. An initial registration of title entails placing the land on
the register and declaring authoritatively the ownership of the
title. This determination, with certain exceptions 2 and in the absence of fraud in its procurement, is conclusive against all persons:
parties or non-parties, resident or non-resident.31)
Proceedings are begun by the presentation of an application,
praying registration. to the district court of the county wherein the
land is situated." This application12 must contain the name and
25 Contrast, however, the great possible savings and selling point of a subdivider. fnfro, note
86 and surrounding text.
6 The ordinary form of conveyance which purports to transfer title operates only as a contract
to convey and outhority to the registrar to transfer the title.
27 Five exceptions appear in the Colorado Statute. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-33 (1953). The
exceptions are listed at note 56 infra.
2"8The rate is one-tenth of one percent per assessed dollar value of property registered. The
sum is collected and held by the county treasurer. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-86 (1953).
211Infra note 56.
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-30, 31 (1953).
31 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-15 (1953). The applicant must also file an abstract of title with the
clerk at the time application is mode. Colo. Rev. Stat. .4 118-10-16 (1953). A copy of the application
certified by the clerk, filed in the office of the county recorder has the effect of a lispendens. Colo.
Rev. Stot. § 118-.10-17 (1953).
;:2Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-4 (1953) lists the necessary elements of the application. Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 118-10-7 (1953) sets forth a petition form.
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address of the applicant, his marital status, and if married the name
of the wife or husband. There must be a designation of the capacity
of the applicant as agent, owner or attorney. The land to be registered must be described in detail and the applicant must allege his
interest therein.3 3 If the land is occupied, the applicant must list
the names of the occupants and the latters' right to possess the
premises. The details of all liens and encumbrances on the land,
including the amount claimed and the name and address of the
claimants, must be given together with a listing of all other estates,
interests and claims of persons in and to the land and the names
and addresses of these persons. Some states also require that the
names and addresses of adjoining owners be given. In Colorado,
this apparently is required only where the applicant desires to have
the boundaries settled.34 All applications must be verified and the
spouse of the title holder should assent, in writing and under oath,
to the registration. In Colorado all persons named in the application are considered defendants to the action; 5 however, it is probable that any person
may assent to the registration and so signify
36
on the petition.
Immediately after the applicant files his abstract of title, the
court then orders referral of the application to an official examiner
of title 37 who proceeds to examine the title, occupancy, interests
and liens on the land described in the application. Upon completion
of his search, the examiner files a report which includes a certificate of his opinion upon the title.38 The clerk of the court thereupon
gives notice to the applicant who must elect, within 3a9 reasonable
time, to proceed further or withdraw his application.
If, in the opinion of the examiner, the applicant has a title as
alleged and proper application for registration, or if the applicant
after an adverse opinion elects to proceed further, the clerk immediately upon the filing of the examiner's opinion or the applicant's
election issues a summons to all persons named in the application
and such additional persons as are named by the examiner.4 0 Notice
by publication is provided where non-resident and unknown interest holders exist. 41 Upon application the court will appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of those not in being and persons under a disability, adding the expense of the same to the
expenses of the proceeding. 42 Any person claiming an interest,
whether named and
served or not, may appear and answer within
43
the time provided.
If an appearance is entered and answer filed, the matter may
be set down for hearing upon motion of any party.4 4 Where an
33 The Colorado act provides that the owner of any estate or interest in land may apply the
title to the land registered. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-1 (1953). If the land is subject to homestead,
tis must be indicated.
34 Colo. Rev. Stat.
118-10-4 (9) (1953).
:35Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-20 (1953).
36 The statute provides only that an assenting person need not be served with summons. Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 118-10-21 (1953). Where the place of residence of any person required to be listed is
unknown, it may be so stated if diligent inquiry has been mode.
37 A competent conveyancing attorney is appointed by the court as the examiner and advisor.
The fee of the examiner is paid by the applicant. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-13 (1953).
38 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-18 (1953) for scope of the examination.
39 The election is to be made in writing and filed with the clerk of the district court. Cola. Rev.
Stat. § 118.10-18 (1953).
40 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-19 (1953).
41 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-20 (1953).
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-24 (1953).
43 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-25 (1953).
44 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118.10-27 (1953). The hearing may be referred to the examiner as a referee.
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adverse party appears and answers within the period provided the
court may, upon motion of the applicant (his right appearing by
satisfactory proof), make its order and decree confirming the title
of the applicant and order registration of the same. 45 Those who
do not appear and answer, when some 4 of
the possible adverse
6
parties appear and answer, are in default.
If the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and an order to
register are entered. The decree binds all parties properly brought
within the jurisdiction of the court, whether they be under a dis7
ability or not, including the state. The decree may be appealed 448
circumstances.
specified
in
certain
except
reopened
be
but may not
The decree by statute bears the date, time of entry, and signature of the court. It defines specifically the interests of all parties
determined by the proceeding. 49 Immediately upon the filing of the
decree in the office of the registrar of titles, the registrar proceeds50
to register the interest in accordance with terms of the decree .
At the time of entry of the "first certificate of title,' 5' 1 the registrar
makes an exact duplicate and delivers it to the owner as evidence
of the entry. The certificate relates back to the date of the decree.5-2
The lands so registered remain registered lands and subject to the
provisions of
the Torrens Act until removed by proper statutory
53
procedures.

B. Transactions Thereafter
In Colorado, as in most jurisdictions, what is ordered or decreed
by the court is what is entered on the register. Since the register
is to contain sufficient statement of the title to make other and
further investigation unnecessary, the decree ordering registration
of title is necessarily broad of scope and contains much detail. In
45 Colo. Rev. Stat.

118-10-26 (1953).

46 Colo. Rev. Stat.
118-10-27 (1953).
47 Colo. Rev. Stat. A 118-10-30 (1953).
48 Persons having an interest in the land brought under the provisions of the act who have
been served, may bring an action to have their rights declared, provided they do so within
statutory period of 90 days. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-31, 32 (1953).
See Gerbig v. Spelts,
Colo. 201, 300 Pac. 606 (1931).
49 Colo. Rev. Stat.
118-10-34 (1953).
50 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-38 (1953).
51 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-39 (1953). Contents and form of the first certificate of title are
out in this section.
52 Colo. Rev. Stat.
118-10-44 (1953).
53 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-36 (1953). This is accomplished by surrender of the duplicate
tificate to the registrar with a written request for withdrawal.
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general, a decree will describe the premises and state the nature
and ownership of all estates, rights 5and
interests therein, and en4
cumbrances to which title is subject.
Persons receiving, a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree
of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
thereafter who takes the certificates of title in good faith and for
value, holds the same free from all incumbrances except those listed
on the last certificate of title in the registrar's office and certain
subsisting "overriding interests."55 The overriding interests specifically excepted from the decree by statute are in fact defects of
title. Their chief significance is that they are binding on the owner
whether or not they appear on the register. The Colorado act, like
most Torrens.system acts, lists the following as overriding interests:
(1) Existing leases not exceeding three years when there
is actual occupation under such leases.
(2) All public highways embraced within the description
of the registered land, and rights of way or easements for
water right or ditch purposes.
(3) Any tax or special assessment for which sale of the
land has not been had at the date of the certificate.
(4) Rights of appeal or rights to reopen under the act itself.
(5) Liens, claims or rights arising under federal law not
required by the laws of Colorado to be of record. 6
The owner of registered title is not restricted in his dealings
with the land. He may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, encumber
or otherwise deal with the property as fully as if it had not been
registered. Current forms of conveyance may be used, but no voluntary instrument of conveyance other than a will or a lease for less
than a three year term 7 is effective as a conveyance unless the
provisions of the act regarding conveyancing of registered lands
are complied with. A purported attempt to convey solely by means
of deed operates as a mere contract between the parties and as
evidence of the authority of the registrar to make registration.-'
Only the act of registration is operative to actually convey or affect
the land. 9
It should be noted that no new certificate will be entered upon
a transfer of registered land that does not divest the fee simple or
a part thereof from the registered owner. Interests less than freehold are indicated by memorial upon the existing certificate and
owner's duplicate. 60
1. Conveyance of freehold interests. To convey registered land,
the owner executes a deed of conveyance which the grantor files
with the registrar in the county where the land is situated. The
owner's duplicate certificate is surrendered and cancelled at the
•54Colo. Rev. Stat.
118-10-34 (1953).
55 Colo. Rev. Stat. 8 118-10-33 (1953).
56 It is also questionable whether a purchaser or mortgagee will be protected if bankruptcy
proceedings have been initiated. The Bankruptcy Act provides that no recording of the petition,
decree of adjudication. or order approving the trustee's bond need be recorded in the county where
the land is located if the record of the original proceedings is kept in the same county. 52 Stat.
852 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1958).
5T See exception number one above.
5 Colo. Rev. Stat.
118-10-48 (1953).

51.Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-48 (1953).
64IColo. Rev. Stat.
118-10-52 (1953).
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same time.6 1 After the original certificate is marked "cancelled,"
the registrar enters a new certificate to the grantee delivering to
him the duplicate. All claims and encumbrances currently adverse
to the title of the registered owner are then stated on the new
certificate, unless discharged in the transfer. When only a part of
the land described is transferred with a portion remaining in the
a new certificate issues to him for the part remaining
transferor,
62
his.
No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered63owner can ever be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
2. Transfer by will or heirship. Heirs at law or devisees, upon
death of the owner of registered lands, may file a certified copy
of the final decree of the probate court and the will (if any) with
the clerk of the district court where the land is located, making
application to the court for an order to enter a new certificate of
title. The court issues notice to all interested persons and may also
give notice by publication. It then directs entry of a new certificate
in favor of those entitled.6" A certificate may issue before complete
settlement of the estate, but a memorial to the effect that the estate
is in the process of settlement is required to appear on the certificate so issued. 5
3. Mortgages or trust deeds. A trust deed is deemed a mortgage
and is entered on the certificate in the form of a memorial. The
mortgagee is entitled to a duplicate of the certificate but it is
marked "mortgagee's duplicate" in large letters across its face. "
The usual proceedings to foreclose a mortgage apply to registered lands, except that notice of pendency of the proceeding must
on the certificate
be filed with the registrar and a memorial entered
67
at the time of the action's commencement.
When the owner of registered land is divested of the land by
decree or judgment, the party entitled to the property has a certificate of title entered in his favor and a duplicate of the certificate
is delivered. The matter is transacted in almost the same manner as
a voluntary conveyance. The new certificate will not enter, however, until the redemption period has expired and an order of the
court issues directing such entry."
4. Leases. Leases of registered lands for over three years' duration are registered in a like manner as a mortgage. The entry is by
way of memorial; a duplicate certificate is delivered to the lessee.'
61 Identity of registered owners is by signature. As in banking practice, the signature on the
duplicate transferring the same to the purchaser is carefully compared to that on the signature ccrd
which was filed with the registrar an the initial registration or preceding transfer.
Loss or destruction of duplicates occasionally occur, and then registration acts all make provision
for issuance of a new duplicate. In some states, Colorado included, this is done only after notice
and hearing by the court, in others proof of loss and identity to the registrar, but in all states under
very careful safeguards. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-54 (1953) (certified copy of duplicate). Neither
the public nor the owner are subject to loss from forged deeds so long as the latter safeguerds his
duplicate with the same care that he keeps any other valuable paper. If he is careless in the matter
of whom he entrusts it, there exists, except for the owner's signature card on file with the registrar,
the some danger that exists with unregistered titles. Elioson v. Wilborn, 335 III. 352, 167 N.E. 101
(1929).
62 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-55 (1953).
63 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-37 (1953). See Dillinger v. North Sterling Ir. Dist., 129 Colo. 17,
266 P.2d 776 (1954). Cf. Gains v. City of Sterling, 140 Colo. 63, 342 P.2d 651 (1959).
64 Colo. Rev. Stat.8 118-10-77 (1953).
63 Colo. Rev. Stat. 118-10-77 (1953).
66 Colo. Rev. Stat. A 118-10-60 (1953).
67 Colo. Rev. Stat. 8 118-10-62 (1953).
68 Colo. Rev. Stat. 118-10-63, 64 (1953).
69 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-66 (1953).
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5. Liens. A judgment or decree of court becomes a lien upon
and affects registered property only when a certificate or transcript
of the judgment docket0 is filed with the registrar and is entered on
the certificate of title.7

6. Mineral transactions-otherinterests. No specific treatment
of mineral interests is provided for in the Colorado act. Transactions
71
in minerals are potential trouble spots to be viewed with caution.
specificalwith
is
dealt
land
in
interests
other
of
many
Registration
ly in chapter ten of the statute.
C. The Assurance Funds
The indemnifying provision of the Colorado Torrens Title Registration Act is an essential feature of the Torrens system and is
found in the great majority of registration statutes.72 It is based
on the simplest premise, that if the state warrants the title under
its own system, then it should remedially compensate the person
who suffered by relying on that warranty. The state thus converts
the sufferer's legal right into cash and theoretically places him (so
far as a monetary payment can do so) in the position he would
have been had the error not occurred.
The state makes provision for this contingent liability it assumes by collecting a fee from persons dealing with land at the
registrar's office. The fee in Colorado is a fixed percentage of the
value of the land concerned and is charged only at the time of7
initial registration, or when the land passes by devise or descent. 3
No further payment is required if the land subsequently increases
in value. The fund built up from these fees is called the "assurance
fund." This fee should not be confused with registration fees
charged to support the cost 4of the operation of the system, and
which are really service fees?
70 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-71, 73 (1953).
71 Alberta, Canada, has had an unfortunate experience in its application of the Torrens laws to
See the famous case of Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Turta, S.C.R. 427, 12 W.W.R.
minerals.
(N.S.) 97 (1954). In Colorado, oil and gas transactions in the northeastern part of the state, the
strongest Torrens section, have given rise to some difficult problems. See 33 Dicta 194 (1956).
72 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-88 (1953). See Patton, The Torrens System of Land Title Registration,
19 Minn. L. Rev. 519, 530 (1935).
73 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-86 (1953).
74 Although an express purpose of the Torrens law is to bring about the cheaper and more
speedy settlement, registration and transfer of title, in view of the expense of initial registration,
it is probably no cheaper to transfer via the Torrens system the first time. Considerable savings
are obtained on subsequent transfers however.
Statutory expenses to be paid the registrar are listed in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-99 (1953).
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Once a loss occurs as the result of an error 75 and the person is
precluded from bringing an action to recover the interest lost,76
a claim may be filed against the fund in the hands of the county
treasurer.77 If persons other than the registrar and his deputies, the
examiner, or clerk of the court are the cause of the loss, then no
final judgment may be entered against the county treasurer until
execution against the other persons is returned unsatisfied. 78 The
assurance fund is not liable for any losses occasioned by breaches of
trust.
The amount recoverable from the fund is the fair market value
of the real estate at the time of the last payment to the assurance
fund.7 9 Many other jurisdictions limit, arbitrarily, the total amount
that can be obtained from the fund. There is no fixed maximum
recovery in Colorado. A limitation as to time is built into the act
making it necessary to make claim against the fund within six years
of the accrual of the right.8 0 Consideration is given to disability
of claimants, however, and claims will not be barred if within two
years of the removal of the disability, claimants assert their rights.8'
There are several serious weakness in the assurance fund provisions.8 2 These weaknesses prevalent in the Torrens laws of the
United States do not exist in England2Y'
CONCLUSION

The possibility of simplification of our land title system should
appeal to every thoughtful and conscientious lawyer, as, other
things being equal, a consummation greatly to be desired. That our
present system of transferring title to land is not all we have a
right to hope for does not admit of question, and those who know
most about its pitfalls and complexities are the ones who most fully
realize the need for improvement and simplification wherever possible.
The relative merits of the two basic systems of regulating the
ownership of land and the transactions with land-deed registra75 The indemnity fund is designed primarily for parties other than the registered owner, whose
title is presumably conclusive. Two broad categories of persons eligible for indemnification are
provided for:
(1) Those sustaining loss through mistake or misfeasance of the registrar or other officers
involved, and
(2) Those wrongfully deprived of an interest by bringing the land under the act, or by
registration as owner or by any mistake, omission or cancellation.
76 Thus, one whose interest in land had been excluded in the registration proceedings would
presumably be obliged to bring a direct action to assert that interest rather than sue for indemnity
until the limitation period expired. And, in the same case where the owner of land was an occupant
at the time of registration and was not served or notified, he would probably at no time have
recourseto the fund. See Chicago Title and Trust Co. v, Darley, 363 III. 197, 1 N.E.2d 846 (1936);
Sheaff v. Spindler, 339 Ill.540, 171 N.E. 632 (1930). These Illinois cases are based on a Torrens
statute provision quite similar to that of Colorado.
77 White v. Ainsworth, 62 Colo. 513, 163 Pac. 959 (1917).
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-89 (1953).
70 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-90 (1953).
80 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-10-91 (1953).
81 Colo. Rev. Stot.
118-10-91 (1953).
82 The prospective claimant faces several serious problems. Not only must he sue the county
treasurer, an unfortunate provision, but the right of action may accrue before the claimant has
knowledge of the mistake. Hence, the possibility exists that the time limitation will expire before
he learns of the defect.
Even if the time limitation has not run out and action against the county treasurer is ripe,
another worry may be that the fund will not be sufficient to meet the claim. The amount contained
in the fund will depend upon the frequency of registration in the county.
83 In England, there is no judicial suit brought against the fund. Instead, there is merely notice
of a claim against the fund. The time begins to run from the date the defect is discovered and
the Exchequer backs up the fund, should it be insufficient to pay a claim. Land Registration Act,
15 Geo V.,ch. 21, §§ 7 and 8 (1925).
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tion and title registration-have been the object of much heated
introduced into the United
debate since title registration was first
States in the late nineteenth century.8 4 This note does not purport
to advocate either theory as the sole answer to our land transfer
problems. Whatever merit attaches to the arguments of proponents
of either system depends in each case on the individual thesis
adopted and the grounds set forth to support it. The writer does,
however, make a plea for an objective evaluation of the possible
regulatory systems and urges that title registration not be overlooked or discounted because of inertia and subjectivism.
A study of usage patterns in given areas indicates that local
conditions tend to dictate the adoption, growth or subsistance of
the particular land system used. For instance the success of the
Torrens system in Chicago has been attributed in part to the fact
that it helped untangle the confusion into which titles were thrown
as a result of the destruction of records in the great fire.
In our own state, in the eastern counties, the Torrens law was
utilized to clear up a rather bad title situation. It seems that this
area was settled under homestead, preemption and timber culture
claims in the late eighties and early nineties. Most acquirers almost
immediately placed a mortgage on the land. Inexperience in farming in a semi-arid region caused the failure of many settlers in
earning a livelihood. Then to complete their ruin came the panic
of 1893. The question of whether to leave or starve was resolved
in favor of abandonment. These settlers left in hordes. Tax liens
added chaos to an already confused title condition. The mortgages
had been "hocked" about in the Eastern states and many had been
abandoned, or parties thereto had died leaving heirs who could not
be found. In 1900 when a boom in these lands was again started by
the development of a new system of farming semi-arid lands, the
necessity for clearing up titles became acute. The Torrens system
was resorted to as the only adequate means of performing the task.
The result was that in the eastern counties of Colorado, from about
1908 to 1918, probably a thousand quarters of land were registered
under the system. A somewhat similar situation arose in New York
state and was remedied by application of title registration laws.8 5
84 Supro note 17. On the other side, see Bordwell, The Resurrection of Registration of Title,
7 Univ. of Chicago L.Rev. 470, 488 (1940).
85 Where quiet title is necessary anyway, registration of the title should definitely be considered.
It involves little waste and is permanent in effect. See McCall, The Torrens System - After ThirtyFive Years, 10 N.C.L. Rev. 329 (1932).
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Registration of titles has been most extensively used in the
large urban centers of a few states.8 6 The reason for this is the
result of real estate and developing companies' discovery that it
is cheaper and safer to have the title to large tracts registered than
to purchase abstracts for each separate tract when they subdivide.
They can then offer the prospective buyer perfect title without a
title search. The buyer merely obtains a new certificate at a nominal cost.
Looking to the other side, in some states there has never been
any real need for the Torrens system.8i Where records of titles are
simple and short as in the younger states, and in those states where
title records are so reasonably correct that even title insurance
companies cannot subsist,' it would probably be wasteful to put a
title through th initial judicial process. It is true that in spite of
many potential danger spots in a given title chain, the basic fact
exists that a vast majority of titles today are sound and marketable.
Other than the useless work of searching such titles each time the
property is conveyed, 9 there is perhaps valid reason for hesitancy
in resorting to the rather lengthy initial adjudication."
Rural communities tend to create less demand for registration
benefits. This is because rural tenures are long-term and less frequently transferred. Even if the initial title is defective, the defects
are usually cured by limitation statutes.
With all these considerations in mind the question is not one
of which theory is preferred. Rather, the problem is which system
will best serve the client's needs. The registration method may not
be appropriate in the particular situation facing the attorney, but
he should not be blinded to the fact of its existence. Where there
is an opportunity to at least consider the new system's usage, it
should not be overlooked. The position of the legal profession in
the premises is a powerful one. As legislators and educators of the
public in law, we can encourage this very workable alternative
system or destroy it-the ultimate choice is ours.
86 Los Angeles, California; Chicago, Illinois; Boston, Massachusetts; Cleveland, Ohio; St. Paul,
Minneapolis and Duluth, Minnesota.
87 The Torrens System was originally initiated as a reform low. Where the evils indicated in
the preamble (Supro note 1) of the prototype act do not exist, there is no need for reform.
88 The State of Utah boosts of this.
89 Supra note 13.
90 Crowded dockets in most jurisdictions seriously delay the initicl adjudication process. It may
take as long as two years to have the title initially registered.
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CASE COMMENTS
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
"We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (U.S. 1961).
With those words the Supreme Court apparently extended the
protection of the fourth amendment to all persons standing trialwhether in a federal or state court. The reasoning behind this extension is not considered here. The important result is that the
"federal rule," excluding illegally obtained evidence,' should now
be followed in state proceedings. Wolf v. Colorado2 is no longer the
law.
Superficially, the forceful prohibitions of the fourth amendment appear to be clear and easily understood. Actually, their substance is far more complicated. Many questions are raised by each
clause, phrase, and even by each word. The decisions of the United
States Supreme Court will be discussed to illustrate outlines of
the federal rule; however, specific points may be supplemented by
reference to decisions of the courts of appeals and of the several
states. There is no dearth of this authority.
I.

TESTS FOR LEGALITY

The discussion can be divided conveniently into three areas
created when the rules governing a lawful search and seizure were
formulated. A search (and seizure) is lawful when it is an incident
to a lawful arrest,3 or when made with a valid search warrant, 4 or
if based upon "probable cause." 5 An examination of the cases in the
Court occurring in these areas provides a reasonably complete
examination of the problem.
A. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
Turning to the first ground upon which a search may be justified a question immediately arises as to the extent of the search.
A search removed from the place of arrest, and at a time subsequent thereto, is not lawfulY
It is apparent, however, that a search incident to a lawful arrest
need not be confined to the immediate area of the arrest. A thorough search of a four-room apartment in which a defendant was
arrested was held to be lawful. 7 The search of an adjoining closet
or bathroom is lawful.' The general rule may be expressed in this
I See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf, the admissibility of illegally obtained enidence was held to be
discretionary w:th the states.
:1 Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957). United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
4 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5 Brinegar n. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
6 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
Assuming a lawful arrest away from one's
house, an officer may not justify a concurrent search of a suspect's house without a warrant solely
on the grounds of belief that an article sought by the officer is in that house.
7 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
8 Marron e. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Abel e. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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way: a search incident to a lawful arrest may extend throughout
the premises over which defendant has effective and exclusive
control.9
Beyond this question of extent of the search incident to a lawful arrest, there are indications given by the Court that a search
and seizure may be unreasonable and hence unlawful if the
"wrong" things are seized, or if too much is seized. The Court sustained the thorough search of a small apartment as a result of
which many draft cards were found, when in fact the officers were
searching for stolen checks. 10 However, this was apparently sanctioned because the draft cards were small, like checks, and would
likely be hidden in the same places as checks-for example, in a
drawer." Disregarding the fact that possession of many draft cards
is a crime against the United States, and that their seizure might
be justified on this ground alone, it was pointed out that seizure
of such small unrelated articles would not be upheld if the officers
something large, such as a stolen automobile
had been searching for 12
or an illegal distillery.
Mere evidentiary material not related to the offense for which
the arrest was made may not be seized. An arrest may not
be used as a pretext to search for evidence of guilt)13 The prosecution in a case may not justify the arrest by the search or, in turn,
There must be a valid basis for the arrest
the search by the arrest.
prior to the search. 14 However, a person may not object if officers
seize "fruits" of crime such as stolen property, weapons, or articles
(the possession of which is a crime);15 furthermore, no objection
can be made where the articles implemented the crime. 16
In one case of "administrativearrest" (an arrest on a deportation warrant) the seizure of articles properly subject to seizure was
upheld, as was the seizure of some items which the suspect attempted to hide. 17 From this case it may be inferred that officers may
search for weapons regardless of the offense for which the arrest
is made.
In addition to restrictions on the nature of the items seized, a
search incident to a lawful arrest may be unreasonable if too much
material is taken. The indiscriminate seizure of every item in a
defendant's house was held to be unlawful."i
There is another basis upon which evidence might be successfully suppressed in a given case. The Supreme Court has frequently
expressed an aversion to general or exploratory search." Such a
search might be characterized as a-"rummaging of the place," and
this has been held to be unreasonable.')

It seems that the protection of the fourth amendment extends
to one's automobile as well as to his home. Search on probable
cause may be more easily sustained in regard to an automobile than
9 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
10 Ibid.

11 Id. at 152.
12 Ibid.

13 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
14 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
15 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
16 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
17 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
18 Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
19 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).

20 Go Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
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to a house, but as an incident to lawful arrest 2it1 appears that the
arrest must be valid before the search is made.
B. Search With a Valid Warrant
Turning to searches made with search warrants, it is clear that
the search is unreasonable if the warrant is invalid. The probable
cause upon which a search warrant will issue is not the same
"probable cause" needed to justify an arrest or search without a
warrant. Since it is not the function here to determine what is
probable cause, it is sufficient to say that if the requisite probable
cause is lacking a warrant may22 not properly issue, and a motion
to suppress should be sustained.
Since the fourth amendment requires that a search warrant
include a particular description of the things to be seized and the
place to be searched, either a procedure which is not specific, or
a search and seizure beyond the limits described, will render the
search and seizure unlawful.
A recent case illustrates the first aspect above. A search warrant, properly issued in regard to probable cause and supported by
oath, but describing the material to be seized only as "obscene" was
held to be invalid.2 3 The difficulty, of course, is apparent when one
considers who is to determine what is "obscene" when the warrantl
is executed. The Supreme Court held that here there was not a.
particular description of the things to be seized, made after a
judicial determination; rather, there was a warrant allowing the
executing
officer to determine himself what was or was not ob24
scene.

In an interesting case, entry to defendant's premises was lawfully gained with a search warrant. The items particularly described
in the warrant and subject to seizure were certain "essential" items
(such as liquor) for conducting an illegal saloon business. Upon
entering the premises, the officers observed one of the defendants
in the act of illegally serving liquor, and for this they arrested him.
As an incident to this lawful arrest, the officers then searched for
21 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
22 U.S. Const. amend. IV. " . . . . and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons.
or thinqs to be seized."
23 Marcus v. Search Warrants, Etc., 81 S.Ct. 1708 (U.S. 1961).
24 Id. at 1716.
25 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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and seized items not 25
described in the warrant. The search was
upheld in spite of this.
With regard to the particular description of the place to be
searched required by the fourth amendment, there has been no
delineation of bounds by the Supreme Court. Perhaps the requirement is self-explanatory, but it appears that problems will arise
as to searches made of basements and storerooms properly used by
many persons-as in apartment houses, and various outbuildings
such as garages.
Thus, what types of premises are protected against unlawful
searches? The fourth amendment uses the word "houses." That this
word has a broad meaning is readily demonstrated in the cases
examined.
A hotel room may be a person's house, 26 as well as a room (or
rooms) in a rooming house. However, in these cases the protection
does not extend to common areas such as hallways. In fact, the
occupant of a single room may not be able to successfully object
to the unlawful, forceful entry into the rooming house itself.27 A
store or office will receive the protection of the fourth amendment,28
although there is some indication that premises open to the public
will not be treated with the same consideration as a private resi30
dence. 29 The property of a corporation is protected in its offices.
The protection of the fourth amendment extends to rented buildings, and the consent of the owner will not be sufficient to justify
a search of premises rented to someone else. 3' Whenever the premises are' fixed and permanent, only the greatest necessity will abrogate the 32requirement that officers obtain a search warrant before
entering.
The protection afforded to movable premises may not be as
great as that given homes, but
33 it does apply as indicated in many
cases involving automobiles.
One more factor deserves mention in this discussion of search
with a warrant. The Supreme Court has held that a warrant issued
for a daylight search will not sustain a later search at night; 34 the
essential purpose of the fourth amendment is to shield the citizen
26 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
2T McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 145 (1948).
28 Gouled v. United States, 225 U.S. 298 (1921).
29 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1960).
30 Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
31 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
32 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
33 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
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from unwarranted intrusion into his privacy. 35 Before a night search
will be justified, the search warrant must provide for such time of
search.
C. Search Made With Probable Cause
The general rule that a search (and seizure) is lawful when
made upon "probable cause" is easily stated. Its application is quite
a different matter. It appears that a case by case determination
will be made in the future as has been done in the past.
It has been said that "probable cause ' 36 is more than mere
suspicion but less than actual evidence to prove guilt. 3 The officer
who wishes to search premises will not be able to do so, lawfully,
if his belief that a felony is being committed is not reasonable and
not founded upon facts within his knowledge. A sharper definition
of this concept must be made on the facts in future cases. The
Supreme Court has indicated that prior arrests, a suspect's reputation, an attempted escape by a suspect when approached by officers, prior illegal use of premises, tips by reliable informants, 3
recent and repeated suspicious conduct, 39 or actual observation of
felonious activity, 40 have provided the requisite elements of probable cause to search without a warrant.
In spite of the existence of probable cause, evidence may be
seized in an unlawful way and may be subject to suppression if
the officer making the search had an opportunity to obtain -a warrant and did not do so. Mere inconvenience and delay will not
excuse the requirement of a search warrant. 41 This is especially
Irue where the premises to be searched are permanent, or where
there is no probability of removal, destruction of evidence, or other
threatened change. 42 Surveillance for a period of time may negate
a showing of probable cause: if a search warrant could not be
obtained after a period of surveillance it would seem that the
stronger grounds required
to sustain a search on probable cause
43
would also be lacking.
A word of caution, regarding motions to suppress evidence
illegally obtained and for return of the property so seized, may be
inserted here. The Supreme Court declined to decide whether or
not probable cause to search without a warrant was present because
the issue was not raised in advance of trial when opportunity was
given. 44 In any case seasonable
objection to the production of the
45
evidence must be made.
Four illustrations of illegal search and seizure do not seem to
fall conveniently into the three categories above, but they are
important to consider.
First, evidence obtained by means of a listening device part of
which unlawfully comes into physical contact with defendant's
34 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 500 (1958).
at 497.
:5 Id.

30
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

I.e., probable cause to believe a felony is being committed or has been committed.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
See Husty -. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Johnson v. United States, supra note 41.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 145 (1948).
Segurolo v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927).
Id. at 112.
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premises
46 may be suppressed on the grounds of an illegal search and
seizure.

Second, the Supreme Court has held that a search by an officer (on this occasion an undercover agent) surreptitiously made
after a lawful entry gained as a result of a business or social call,
or after
47 an entry gained by stealth, would violate the fourth amendment.

Third, if officers gain entry by dqmand, and it is granted in
48
because
be held illegal
deference to their authority, such entry mayauthority.
of the implied coercion flowing from this
Finally, there would appear to be an important consideration
involved in deciding who may consent to a search of premises upon
demand made by officers. 49 Entry by coercion may well vitiate consent as indicated above; and although no case was found on the
point it would seem that consent could not be effective if in fact
the person consenting did not understand the language of the
officers, and hence misunderstood their meaning.
II.

WHO MAY SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

The standing of a person to move to suppress evidence illegally obtained has received recent comment by the Court. Earlier
cases, .basing the defendant's standing to object on a proprietary
interest in the things seized or upon the amount of control exercised over the premises, may now be open to serious question. No
longer will the Court base such distinctions on the niceties of tort
law; it appears that anyone legitimately on the premises may object
to the unlawful seizure of property therefrom. 50 The Supreme Court
has also pointed out that the possession of narcotics charged by
the government, but denied by the defendant, nonetheless gives the
defendant the requisite standing to move to suppress evidence
illegally seized. 51
CONCLUSION

Upon a thorough reading of the cases it is apparent that each
decision depends upon its peculiar facts. 52 In the area of probable
cause-that needed to obtain a warrant, and that needed to sustain
a search without a warrant-one can hardly formulate any definite
rules. The same situation exists when the question of lawful arrest
arises.
It appears in these cases that the Supreme Court is leaning
toward a stricter enforcement of the constitutional guaranties. As
pointed out in many cases the fourth amendment protects only
against unreasonable searches. So, an argument would seem strongest when based directly upon the unreasonablenessof the conduct
of the searching officers. If the Court finds a search to be unreasonable, evidence obtained thereby will be illegal, and the rule of
Mapp v. Ohio excluding such evidence in both federal and state

courts will apply.

Donald Blanchard

46 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
47 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
48 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
411 Two cases from the courts of appeals may be referred

to regarding consent given to a

search

by the wife of defendant, United States v. Heine, 149 F.2d 485 (1945); or by the superintendent of
defendant's apartment building, Reszutek v. United States, 147 F.2d 142 (1945).
50 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
51 Ibid.
52 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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BAR BRIEFS
OPINION NO. 22
OF THE ETHICS 'COMMITTEE OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
ADOPTED JANUARY 26, 1962
SYLLABUS

It is improper for an attorney to record by means of a mechanical or electronic device conversations or statements without disclosing that the conversations or statements are being recorded.
FACTS

A lawyer, by means of a mechanical or electronic device, records
conversations with and statements by other persons. The lawyer
deliberately does not disclose that a record is being made of the
conversations or statements. Is there any impropriety in such action?
OPINION

One of the principal purposes of the Canons of Ethics is to
increase public confidence in the legal profession. This end can be
achieved only if individual members of the Bar earn a reputation
as men of honor, integrity and fair dealing. Conversely, every
deceptive practice and every resort to artifice by an attorney must
necessarily demean the Bar as a whole in addition to the particular
attorney involved.
Great advances in the availability and effectiveness of various
kinds of recording devices have been made in recent years. Most
attorneys use some type of recording device routinely in their
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offices and such devices are often helpful in taking and preserving
conversations and statements by clients, potential witnesses and
others. Insofar as these devices permit a more efficient utilization
of an attorney's time, their use should be encouraged.
There is, however, a significant distinction from an ethical
standpoint between the open and acknowledged use of such cevise
by an attorney on the one hand, and secret, concealed and undisclosed use on the other hand. Where an attorney discloses that he
is recording a conversation, he is, in effect, asking the other persons
present for their consent to such procedure. A person so advised
has the option of having his words recorded or of saying nothing.
No such option is accorded one whose words are recorded without
his knowledge.
Despite the increasing frequency with which various recording
devices are used in our society, we believe that the large majority
of persons would not suspect that a conversation with an attorney
was being surreptitiously recorded. Moreover, one reason for an
attorney intentionally not disclosing that a particular conversation
or statement is being recorded may be a belief that the person
whose conversation is being recorded would choose his words more
carefully, or speak less freely, or not at all, if such knowledge were
imparted to him.
Consequently, there is inherent in the undisclosed use of a
recording device under these circumstances an element of deception, artifice or trickery which falls below the standard of candor
and fairness which all attorneys are bound to uphold. Canon 22,
Canons of Professional Ethics. See Opinions numbered 624 and
633, Association of the Bar or the City of New York. The fact that
in some instances the statements secretly recorded are those of
potentially adverse witnesses in no way alters our opinion. Canon
18, Canons of Professional Ethics. Cf. Opinion No. 117, Opinions of
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, American Bar
Association.
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